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Employment contracts for most employees are not publicly available,
leaving researchers to speculate about whether they contain postemployment
restrictions on employee mobility, and if so, what those provisions look like.
Using a large sample of publicly available CEO employment contracts, we are
able to examine these noncompetition covenants, including postemployment
covenants not to compete ("CNCs" or "noncompetes'), nonsolicitation
agreements ("NSAs"), and nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs'). What we found
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confirms some long-held assumptions about restrictive covenants but also
uncovers some surprises.
We begin by discussing why employers use restrictive covenants and
examining how the courts have treated them. We then analyze an extensive
sample of CEO employment contracts drawn from a large random sample of
500 S&P 1500 companies. We find that 80% of these employment contracts
contain CNCs, often with a broad geographicscope, and that these generally
last only one to two years. Similarly, we find that NSAs routinely appear in
these contracts, barringsolicitation of the firm's employees and customers or
clients. We demonstrate that NDAs are prevalent and prohibit the CEOs from
disclosing unspecified "confidential information." In addition, we note that
there is a strong "Californiaeffect," whereby firms from that state are less
likely to put CNCs in employment contracts.
Our research also uncovers several previously undocumented trends.
First, increasingly more and more restrictive covenants are appearing over
time, and they are appearing with increasingly expansive enforcement rights
for the firm.. Second, there is clear path dependence for these clauses, with a
prior CNC being a strong predictor of CNC use in future employment
contracts. Third, long-term contracts are more likely to have CNC clauses
than short-term contracts, probably because firms have more confidence in
making investments in CEOs that are committed to staying for longer periods.
We argue that this shows that for some firms the risk of harm from a
departingexecutive may simply be more acute than for other firms.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A departing key employee can seriously harm a firm by leaving
to work for the firm's competitors or by providing these competitors
with the firm's confidential business information. Firms, therefore,
have strong incentives to seek to impose broad covenants not to
compete and other postemployment restrictive covenants on these
employees. However, most employment contracts are not publicly
available, leaving researchers to speculate on the prevalence of these
restrictions and their contents. Fortunately, public companies must
disclose their CEOs' employment contracts. This mandatory disclosure
permits us to examine them to determine how frequently, and how
broadly, employers use covenants not to compete ("CNCs" or
"noncompetes"),
nonsolicitation
agreements
("NSAs"),
and
nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs").1
In this paper, we first discuss what is currently known about
the use and purpose of these restrictive covenants and why they
remain controversial. We then analyze 874 CEO employment
contracts initiated between 1996 and 2010 from a random sample of
500 S&P 1500 companies to develop the first comprehensive study of
the prevalence and details of restrictive covenants in public company
employment contracts. We find that 80% of these employment
contracts contain CNCs that commonly last one to two years.
Although 89% of the CNCs forbid CEOs from working for a competitor
during the term of the CNC, only 25% prohibit CEOs from financing
competitors. These covenants often have a broad geographic scope: for
example, 38% bar the CEO from working in any jurisdiction where the
company has operations.
We also find that NSAs and NDAs frequently show up in CEO
employment contracts. NSAs routinely appear in CEO contracts with
CNCs and typically restrict CEOs' behavior for a period of one to two
years: 75.6% of these contracts bar solicitation of the firms' employees,

1.
We recognize that CEOs are the highest-level employees of these firms and that many
commentators have claimed that their contracts are skewed to favor the executive at the expense
of the employer, making it less likely that such postemployment restrictions will appear in their
contracts in comparison to those of other lower-level employees. If this is true, then our results
may understate the frequency and breadth of such restrictions imposed on other employees.
Some scholars have concluded that agency problems abound in the realm of executive
compensation with CEOs dominating boards when it comes to the terms of employment. See, e.g.,
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23-44 (2004) (arguing that board and executive bargaining are not
conducted at arm's length). But see John Core, Wayne Guay & Randall Thomas, Is U.S. CEO
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1158-60 (2005)
(arguing against the managerial power theory of governance).
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and 50.8% proscribe the solicitation of customers or clients.
Additionally, this study reveals that NDAs are quite common as well:
87.1% of all contracts prohibit CEOs from disclosing unspecified
"confidential information." Also, a host of other more detailed
prohibitions are quite common and frequently last an indefinite period
of time.
Interestingly, we also uncover strong evidence that employers
add an increasing number of restrictive covenants to new contracts
over time, so that today over 70% of CEO contracts contain three or
four restrictive covenants. Furthermore, more than half of these
covenants are triggered by any departure of the CEO from the firm,
whether voluntary or involuntary. Finally, companies negotiate the
express right to seek an injunction to enforce these provisions in
79.5% of the contracts. Plainly, firms are aggressively negotiating to
include these covenants in their CEOs' employment agreements.
We also examine factors that indicate when CEOs will likely
have CNC provisions in their contracts. First, our analysis shows that
CEOs are more likely to have CNCs in their employment contracts if
their contracts are being enforced in jurisdictions that permit strong
CNC clauses. One important state that does not permit enforcement of
CNCs is California. 2 Accordingly, we find that CEO contracts in
California are much less likely to include noncompete clauses. Second,
there is a significant trend toward greater usage of CNC clauses in
CEO employment contracts. This suggests that employers are more
aware than ever of the importance of using CNC clauses and confirms
other scholars' assumptions that, at least in the CEO context,
employers increasingly use these clauses. Third, there is strong path
dependence, or "stickiness," in the use of CNC clauses: if a company
has used one in a prior employment contract, then it is much more
likely to insist on one in a later contract. Next, long-term employment
contracts are more likely to have CNC clauses than short-term
contracts. This is likely because firms have more human capital
investment in CEOs who are expected to stay for longer periods.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we contextualize the
role of restrictive employment covenants such as CNCs, NSAs, and
NDAs. Next, in Part III, we describe our data collection and study
methodology. Part IV presents the empirical portion of the Article,
where we analyze statistics on the presence, length, and scope of
CNCs, NSAs, and NDAs. Finally, Part V discusses our findings and

2.

See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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their policy implications, and offers some brief concluding remarks
and recommendations for further research.
II. THE LAW AND USE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Historically, ever since employers first began including
covenants not to compete in employee contracts when the guild system
began breaking down in early eighteenth-century London, competitive
restrictions in employment contracts have been contentious.3
Restrictive covenants remain controversial today,4 even as they have
seemingly proliferated among employers.5 Despite this long history of
restrictive covenants in employment contracts, this area of law
continues to evolve: the last decade saw the advent of new or revised
state statutes 6 and proposed legislation7 designed to refine how

3.
See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 62931 (1960) (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.); 1 P. Wms. 181) (providing
the leading historical account of the common-law origins and initial use of covenants not to
compete).
4.
See Orly Lobel, Why Noncompetes May Give You the Least Desirable Employees, WALL
ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2014, 4:30 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/01/22/
orly-lobel-why-non-competes-may-give-you-the-least-desirable-employees/
(asserting
that
noncompetes have potentially corrosive effects, including the retention of the least valuable
employees). See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO
LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 7 (2013) (arguing for unfettered and noncompete-free
policies to promote labor mobility; "We will discover that the default mentality of protectionism
is frequently archaic and misguided. Counterintuitively, the way to gain is often by allowing
tactical loss.").
5.
See Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of
Transaction-CostAnalysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001) (stating that noncompete agreements "are
an increasingly common feature of employment .... ); Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the
Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2010)
("As the use of noncompetes has become more widespread, controversy over these agreements
has also increased."); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications for
the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 577 (2001)
(citing search of reported litigation, and noting: "The sheer volume of litigated cases between
employers and former employees involving trade secrets, covenants not to compete, and the duty
of loyalty has mushroomed in the past ten years."); Peter J. Whitmore, A StatisticalAnalysis of
Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 526-27 (1990) (finding
evidence of a rise in appellate decisions involving disputes involving noncompetes).
6.
See COLO. REV. ST. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2012) ("Unlawful to intimidate workeragreement not to compete"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2012) ("Restraint of business
prohibited; restraint on forum prohibited; competing business; contracts against engaging in;
provisions for"); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2012) ("Noncompetition agreements; bonus restriction
agreements").
7.
For example, in the last few years several states have seen the introduction of
legislation limiting the situations or types of workers permissibly covered by employee CNCs or
allowing for specific notice periods before a CNC can be requested from an employee. See H.
2293, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011), available at http://www.massachusettsnoncompetelaw.com/
uploads/file/Noncompete%20Bill%20-%202011%2OAs%2OFiled%201-20-2011.pdf,
archived at
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employers use these clauses to restrict employees' postemployment
mobility and choices.
Restrictions such as CNCs8 are often criticized as contracts of
adhesion arising out of a perceived inequality in bargaining power
between employers and employees.9 Professor Cynthia Estlund has
broadly stated this argument: "Most contract terms are offered by
employers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and are set under the shadow
of employment at will-the employer's presumptive power to fire
employees for any reason at all, including refusal to accept the
employer's proffered or modified terms of employment."1 0 In contrast,

http://perma.cc/C8TN-3XMC (proposing amendments to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 1 (2006));
see also S.B. 1771, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2012) (proposing amendments to OKLA. STAT. tit.
15, § 219A (2011), including sections on "noncompetition agreements" and "modifying
requirements for certain agreements"); H.B. 0016, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011)
(establishing criteria for the enforceability of noncompete covenants); S.B. 786, 96th Leg. (Mich.
2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/127269020/Michigan-Non-Compete-Bill-SB-786,
archived at http://perma.cc/P7YA-BU2K (amending "Michigan antitrust reform act," MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 445.774a (1987)).
8.
In this Article, we focus on postemployment restrictions that limit employee mobility
and competitive behavior. We do not discuss covenants not to compete that restrict the activities
of a former owner of a business where such restrictions are intended to protect the goodwill of a
business following a sale. The latter species of noncompete agreement are less controversial in
that they are perhaps less subject to abuse and are clearly tailored to protect a legitimate
business interest such that they are even permissible in California where employee noncompetes
are virtually banned. See, e.g., Alliant Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Gaddy, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 266-68
(2008) (discussing the sale of business goodwill exception to California's ban on noncompetes and
enforcing a state-wide contractual prohibition on the seller's insurance brokerage activities).
9.
Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman asserts that disparate bargaining positions make it
"inappropriate to view noncompete terms as the product of reasoned reflection or as dispositive of
the parties' rights and obligations." Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the
Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee
Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1215 (2001). She argues that "[e]ven if a particular employee
possesses valuable human capital that is in demand in the relevant market, . . . there are
[substantive and procedural] reasons to distrust the quality of the bargain he or she reaches with
the employer." Id. at 1214. These concerns include employees being asked to sign a noncompete
on their first day to continue their employment, the lack of employee bargaining power, and
limited information about the future implications of the noncompete. Id.
10.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and NonCompete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 384-85
(2006).
Professor Estlund adds that:
Skepticism about the bargaining power of employees has contributed to courts'
willingness to intervene in the employment contract to redress abuses that offend
public policy-for example, a discharge for refusing to violate the law or for exercising
an employment-related right (e.g., filing a workers' compensation claim). Still, most
terms of the employment relationship are governed not by external law or public
policy but by the express or implied agreement of the parties.
Id. at 385. See also Christopher T. Wonnell, The ContractualDisempowerment of Employees, 46
STAN. L. REV. 87, 106 (1993) ("Employers often use these covenants to indirectly induce
employees not to quit, and free labor proponents criticize these covenants on this ground.").
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Professor Christopher Wonnell has argued for more judicial support
for employees' right to bind themselves by contract,u albeit while
recognizing the potential drawbacks of employee noncompete
contracts. 12
Nonsolicitation agreements, which we group as a subcategory
of CNCs, can come in various forms, such as temporary prohibitions
on recruiting former coworkers (sometimes called poaching)' 3 or
approaching former clients.1 4 In either case, the resulting agreement
is designed to limit what would otherwise be permissible competitive
behavior. Some scholars have deemed NSAs problematic because they
can be both anticompetitive and limit the freedom of association of the
former employee.' 5 Similarly, NDAs that restrict the use and transfer
of knowledge in a business context are potentially anticompetitive,
implicate issues of freedom of speech, and raise concerns "that many
contracts between private parties can be highly coercive or
unconscionable."' 6 Courts scrutinize all of these contractual

11. Wonnell, supra note 10, at 89:
The involuntary servitude argument does not wholly lack merit; indeed, the concerns
that drive it are compelling in many contexts, and make it difficult to find a morally
acceptable way to make employee promises binding. Still, the substantial economic
harm to workers from their wholesale disempowerment justifies a critical exploration
of the absence of contract remedies.
12. Id. at 106:
An employment contract, in comparison [to a noncompete agreement], may often be
less harsh. It represents a promise to refrain from competition only as long as the
employer remains willing to provide employment and imposes duties only during
employment. A reasonable person might be willing to enter into a binding
employment contract but refuse to enter into a covenant not to compete.
13. See Jin-Hyuk Kim, Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to
Compete 24 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgibin/conference/download.cgi?db-name=IIOC2008&paper id=16,archived at
http://perma.cc/
FA2Q-BSKP (discussing instances, in light of noncompetes, in which a firm's behavior in
poaching workers from its competitors can be either acceptable competition or a predatory act).
14. See David L. Johnson, The Parameters of "Solicitation"in an Era of Non-Solicitation
Covenants, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 99 (2012) (discussing the enforcement implications of
nonsolicitation provisions).
15. Id.
16.
Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1701 (2009) (adding that their approach to setting boundaries 'between
First Amendment law and contract law for private-sector speech restrictions" would not "prevent
courts from invalidating such contracts based on duress, unconscionability, or contravention of
public policy [and that] free speech effects of contracts could certainly be a valid public policy
reason to render them unenforceable"; however, "[t]his would be an issue for contract law, not
the First Amendment").
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restrictions on employee mobility because of their tendency to restrict
otherwise lawful competition.17
Whatever the merits of these claims in the context of rank-andfile employees, such concerns are largely absent for CEOs who accept
restrictive covenants in their employment contracts.1 8 This is because
CEOs enjoy substantial bargaining power and are routinely
represented by legal counsel when they negotiate their employment
contracts. 19 It is also true that in the last decades companies have
increased CEOs' compensation relative to other employees. 20 In fact,
in the context of CEO employment contracts, the disparity in
bargaining power argument against allowing restrictive employment
covenants is turned upside down if one believes some commentators'
claims that CEOs virtually dictate contract terms that are most
favorable to them. 2 1 These commentators suggest that CEOs dominate
their firms' boards of directors in high-stakes negotiations on issues

17. See e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1222-23 (N.Y. 1999) (discussing
the state's approach to noncompete enforcement and the hesitancy to expand noncompete
coverage).
18. Joann S. Lublin, Companies Loosen the Handcuffs on Non-Competes: Companies Are
Making It Easier for Senior Managers to Jump Ship, Though It Can Be Costly, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
12,
2013
11:12
AM),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324085304579008592336383078 (discussing how some senior executives are
able to negotiate with their former firms to avoid enforcement of a post-employment
noncompete).
19. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An EmpiricalAnalysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargainfor?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 236-41 (2006).
20.
See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 20-21 (2012) (discussing how, since

1991, CEO pay outpaced average worker pay by a ratio of 140 times, with that ratio rising to
about 500 times average worker pay by 2003); see also Jennifer Liberto, CEO Pay Is 380 Times
Average Worker's-AFL-CIO, CNNMONEY (Apr. 19, 2012 1:12PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/
04/19/news/economy/ceo-pay/index.htm, archived at http://perma.cclW38G-7FU3 (citing recent
labor union statistics that the average CEO at a top firm now earns a pay package that is 380
times that of the average worker and noting the CEO pay differential in 1980 was at 42 times
the average worker salary).
21.
For a leading articulation of the managerial power perspective, see generally BEBCHUK
& FRIED, supra note 1, at 61-79.
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such as managerial compensation 22 and the terms of their employment
relationships.

23

What exactly firms are trying to protect by using CNCs has
been the subject of several theories by leading legal scholars. 24 One
theory is that CNCs are an important tool for creating incentives for
employers to invest in key employee training and skills because the
security of a tailored CNC gives the employer a limited quasi-property
right in that human capital. 25 In a similar vein, CNCs could be
conceptualized as conditional waivers of employee rights that
recognize that employers also have interests that can be protected at
the expense of employee freedoms, as long as they are truly legitimate

22.
See DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS: A CLOSER
LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 237 (2011):

Because of potential imbalances between supply and demand and the difficulty in
evaluating the quality of candidates, it is not always easy for boards to identify the
appropriate executive or the market wage necessary to attract [a qualified CEO].
Moreover, some board members might provide insufficient oversight (because of a lack
of independence, insufficient engagement, or a lack of power relative to the CEO)
during the compensation-setting process. These factors have the potential to distort
executive compensation packages, in terms of both size and structure.
23. The potentially fraught contracting process between CEOs and their firms and some of
its problems have been described as follows:
While contracting clearly is a significant source of governance rules for corporations,
the contracting process is very costly. Take, for example, the issue of executive
compensation. Many economists are of the view that the broadening gap between
CEO and rank-and-file pay reflects a failure of corporate-governance practices to
maintain a proper relationship between compensation and performance. The specific
executive compensation arrangements that we actually observe, however, simply
reflect the result of a bargaining process between shareholders' elected
representatives and managers. It would be possible for companies, especially
companies selling shares to the public for the first time, to design more modest
compensation packages. At a minimum, it would be possible for directors to have at
least a basic understanding of the compensation arrangements they are reaching with
top executives. In recent years, it has turned out that directors of corporate giants like
Disney and United Health did not even comprehend how much their companies might
be on the hook for the multimillion arrangements they reached with top corporate
officers.
JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 23-24

(2008).
See the noncompete agreement discussion infra Part II.A.
24.
25.
Eric A. Posner, Alexander Triantis & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete
from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective 2-3 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
archived at
137, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf'abstractid=285805,
http://perma.cc/ YD5Z-XCGY (discussing the two objectives of ex post (labor mobility) and ex ante
(human capital investment) negotiations). For a more general framework, see Gary S. Becker,
Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9, 10-11 (1962). See also
Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
93, 93 (1981) (relating Becker's general and specific human capital distinction to covenant not to
compete law).
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These and other perspectives such as freedom of contract, 27

or even viewing CNCs as a business strategy tool for both "proprietary
protection and strategic coercion," 28 offer potentially useful
explanations for the presence of CNC clauses and other restrictive
covenants in CEO employment contracts.
Despite the heated discussion of the pros and cons of restrictive
employment covenants by academics, practitioners, and state
legislatures, there are few empirical studies examining these
agreements to provide evidence and guidance for businesses,
employees, or policymakers. 29 Specifically, we are the first to track the
prevalence of these clauses by examining the terms of actual
employment contracts.
The existing empirical studies on restrictive covenants in the
management and economics literature are important to the discussion
of CNCs and human capital investment. 30 However, these previous
studies have used the availability of CNC enforcement in a given
jurisdiction as a surrogate for the likely presence of a CNC for certain
types of employeeS 31 or for a limited number of technology regions. 32 In
26.
Estlund, supra note 10, at 415-20; see also infra Part II.A (discussing the legitimate
interests prong of the usual common-law analysis).
27.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981)
(stating the general proposition that "parties may contract as they wish, and courts will enforce
their agreements without passing on their substance").
28.
Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 765 (2010) ("The often litigated covenant not to compete in the
employment setting serves two strategic purposes: proprietary protection and strategic
coercion."). Professor DiMatteo further argues that the first purpose for the employer
noncompete enforcement "relates to the employer's proprietary property that has been disclosed
to the employee and that the employer seeks to protect" while the second purpose "seeks to deter
employee movement to a competitor." Id. He adds that the first intent:
[I]s best served by drafting a covenant that is likely to be enforced by the
courts .. . [such that an] employer shows that there is some proprietary interesttrade secrets, know-how, client contacts, access to key employees, specialized training,
databases, and compilations-that are susceptible to being harmed if used or
disclosed to a new employer."
Id. For the second purpose he finds that it is an employer's attempt to overreach and assert
control of the employee. Id.
29. Notably, one of the authors' previous research collected and analyzed some data on
CEO noncompetes; however, that study focused on other aspects of the executives' contracts. See
Schwab & Thomas, supra note 19, at 254-57.
30.
See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Non-Competition Agreements,
Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 376-79 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the
Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SC. 875 (2009) (examining patent-holding
employees in Michigan during a natural experiment related to a temporary repeal of CNC
enforcement).
32. See, e.g., Bruce Fallick, Charles A. Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, Job-Hopping in
Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-Foundationsof a High-Technology Cluster,
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contrast, our large study utilizes a state-by-state enforcement index
and includes many executives across all U.S. jurisdictions and many
industries over a long period, thus providing a more comprehensive
and accurate picture of restrictive covenant use.
A. Noncompetition Clauses
Employers seek to restrict the postemployment activities of
their employees-regardless of their rank and status-in several
ways. When a worker is still employed by a particular firm, the
employee has default fiduciary duties that guard against unfair
competition with the employer. 33 These fiduciary duties, which
continue to evolve, 34 are found throughout corporate law and include
the duty of care3 5 and, most crucially, the duty of loyalty.36
Specifically, the duty of loyalty helps ensure that employees will serve
the firm's interests and refrain from harmful competition with it
during their employment. 37 However, once they are terminated-for
whatever reason-these duties end, and the departing employee is
generally free to engage in any lawful competition. 38 The employee's
valuable knowledge, skills, and relationships walk out the door when
the employee leaves and begins to compete with his or her former

88 REV. EcON. & STAT. 472, 475-81 (2006) (comparing several high-tech regional economies);
Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical
Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 700 (2011) (relying on interviews of a small sample of hightech workers).
33.
See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge of Company Stock Transactions
for Directors' Duties of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437, 444-57 (2006) (focusing on an
executive's duty of loyalty to the firm).
See Andrew Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in CorporateLaw, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
34.
457, 461-64 (2009) (arguing that legal definitions of a duty of loyalty draw upon a common social
understanding of loyalty, and discussing the historical expansion of fiduciary duties in U.S.
corporate law to include the duty of good faith).
See Julian Velasco, How Many FiduciariesAre There in Corporate Law, 83 S. CAL. L.
35.
REV. 1231, 1233 (2010) (discussing the fairness evaluation in corporate governance-related
duties).
36.
See Melvin Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faithin CorporateLaw, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1,
3 (2006) (reiterating that the three core fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers are
the duties of loyalty, care, and good faith).
37. Muir & Schipani, supra note 33, at 444-57.
38. Wendi S. Lazar & Gary R. Siniscalco, Confidentiality, Trade Secrets, and Other Duties
and Restrictive Covenants in a Global Economy, in RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND TRADE SECRETS
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 19 (Wendi S. Lazar & Gary R. Siniscalco eds.,
2010) ("In many U.S. states, in addition to the common law recognition of the duty of loyalty that
prevents employees from 'raiding' employers' clients during employment, nonsolicitation
provisions post employment will generally be upheld as long as they are reasonable and
necessary to protect an employer's legitimate business interest." (case citations omitted)).
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firm, to the consternation of an employer that believes it owns the
very knowledge, skills, and relationships at issue. 9
The employer's goal for restrictive postemployment covenants
is to control the activities of a former employee after the usual
employee-employer relationship ends, effectively retaining exclusive
use of the information and competitive advantage by contract. 40 In this
way, the company may temporarily maintain the status quo that
existed prior to the employee's departure and avoid potentially serious
losses.41 In the case of a CEO, there is a far greater risk of harm
associated with losing that key employee to a competitor, which
increases an employer's incentive to insist on postemployment
restrictions. This is because CEOs typically help create or have
knowledge of and unfettered access to all of a firm's trade secrets,
supplier and customer information, strategic plans, strengths, and
weaknesses. 42
There are several typical contract mechanisms employers use
to restrict or penalize an employee's postemployment competition.
These include general prohibitions on competition in the form of
classic CNCs, NSAs related to pursuing clients and recruiting other
employees, NDAs, 43 repayment and forfeiture agreements, 44 and even
39. See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine
Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 982-83 (2012) (acknowledging the
potential "knowledge ownership dispute" between an employer and departing employee); see also
Marx, supra note 32, at 697, explaining employee knowledge mobility as follows:
Inseparability of skills from individuals suggests that workers can use skills
developed at (or prior to) one organization or firm when moving to another. Such
reasoning underlies the notion that modern careers are not organizationally
circumscribed but boundaryless: workers move from firm to firm, carrying their
accumulated experience with them.
(citations omitted).
40. For a description of the use of contracts as a corporate governance mechanism and the
gap-filling role of the underlying law related to fiduciary duties, see MACEY, supra note 23, at
22-23, where he explains:
The purpose of the various laws of business organizations is to facilitate the
contracting process, not to displace the actual contracts reached by the parties.
Business organizations need law, including fiduciary duties, because it simply is not
possible for those who organize business to identify all of the potential problems and
conflicts that inevitably will arise in a business. Specific issues and transactions
invariably will present themselves that could not have been identified ex ante.
Fiduciary duties exist to provide a framework for dealing with those issues.
41. See Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics of
Restrictions on an Employee's Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2012)
(highlighting the problems and benefits of employee restrictive covenants).
42. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, ManagerialPower and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762-63 (2002).
43.
See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS.
L.J. 151, 169-71 (1998) (discussing noncompete enforcement in the context of other restrictive
covenants that restrict employee disclosure, including confidentiality agreements).
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"garden leave" clauses. 45 This Section focuses on noncompete clauses,
which are the broadest restrictive covenants. Employers craft CNCs to
stop departing employees from competing with them in any manner.
Thus, where permissible under a state's law and within the bounds of
public policy, 46 many employers will insist that their employees accept
noncompete clauses in their employment contracts. 47 In effect, the
CNC allows the firm to control information and skills through the
equity mechanism of an injunction prohibiting the employee from
going to work with another employer. 48
Courts interpret these clauses with some suspicion because of
their anticompetitive nature 49 and likely adverse effects on the

&

44.
See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399 (LAP), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15342, at *7-24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), affd, 437 Fed. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011) (denying
former employer IBM's request to enforce an executive's noncompete after he was hired by
competitor Hewlett-Packard).
45.
The concept of garden leave is an alternative to a traditional CNC. The employee
agrees to provide a relatively long notice-of-termination period, during which the individual
remains an employee with all of the attendant fiduciary duties, is essentially paid not to come to
work, and, accordingly, is prohibited from taking other employment with a competitor. See Bob
Hepple, The Duty of Employee Loyalty in English Law, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 205, 214
(1999):
[The employer] "pay[s] the employee's salary during this period without requiring the
employee to come into work . .. on the assumption that the employee will have to stay
home and work in the garden, but will be financially secure until the period of notice
expires and he or she is then free to work for the competitor.
For a discussion of recent coverage of the garden leave concept in the academic literature, see
Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 25-27. See also Greg T. Lembrich, Note,
Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive Employment
Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2002) ("Garden leave may provide a solution to the
prevailing uncertainty regarding the enforceability of restrictive covenants in the United
States . .. however, American courts have not ruled on the legitimacy of garden leave
provisions.").
46. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1499 (2010) (comparing New York and California's treatments of
contracts against public policy, noting that both "place limits on covenants not to compete and
related clauses, but California is significantly more willing to reject agreements on this ground").
47.
See, e.g., Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee Restrictive
Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 389, 389 (2009) (discussing a
rise in noncompete litigation in the face of greater employee mobility and increased use of
technology in the workplace, and concluding that greater movement of workers "is partly the
result of technological change facilitating individual movement and communication, but also a
result of corresponding changes in corporate organization to establish offices and interests in
multiple jurisdictions" and that "[w]ith these developments, there has been a rise in litigation
surrounding the enforcement of employee covenants not to compete when the parties or issues
involved have connections to multiple jurisdictions").
48. For a discussion of the use of noncompetes to inhibit employee mobility, see Bishara
Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 2-3.
49. See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 80.15 (2013) ("Many courts are more suspect of
restraints accompanying employment contracts than they are of restraints accompanying the
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employee's further employment prospects.5 0 However, these terms will
generally be judicially evaluated using a balancing test that weighs
the firm's protectable business interest,5 1 the purpose of the
restriction, the scope (in time and geography) of the restriction, and
the potential harm to the employee and the public.52 Stated more
formally, a typical articulation of the common-law reasonableness test
is as follows:
(1) the employer must have a legally protected interest; (2) the restrictive covenant must
be no wider in scope and duration than is reasonably necessary to protect the employer's
interest; (3) the covenant cannot impose an undue hardship on the employee; and (4) the
53
covenant cannot violate public policy.

Despite
their long history, these restrictions remain
contentious among courts and policymakers, as well as with
scholars. 54 Perhaps the most active discussion regarding the propriety
of CNCs relates to the well-known academic argument that the
economic growth of Silicon Valley was made possible in part because
of California's ban on noncompetes.5 5 The state's longstanding, strong

sale of business and so these courts apply a stricter scrutiny to covenants accompanying
employment agreements.").
50.
See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) (hesitating to
enforce a restrictive covenant because of the anticompetitive nature of such restrictions).
51.
The Illinois Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the "protection of a legitimate
business interest" prong in Reliable FireEquip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 2011).
There, the court concluded that:
Under some circumstances, "a promise to refrain from competition is a natural and
reasonable means of protecting a legitimate interest of the promisee." Restatement of
Contracts, 2d, § 188 cmt. b (1981). In the case of a postemployment restraint, where
the employer-promisee exacts from the employee a promise not to compete after
termination of the employment, the restraint is usually justified on the ground that
the employer has a legitimate business interest in restraining the employee from
appropriating the employer's (1) confidential trade information, or (2) customer
relationships. Id. cmts. b, g.
Id. at 401 (citing Blake, supra note 3, at 651-74); see also Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v.
Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (acknowledging "the legitimate interest an employer
has in safeguarding that which his business made successful and to protect himself against
deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy").
52.
See generally Blake, supra note 3, at 631 (explaining the public policy concerns
underlying the common-law origin of covenants not to compete).
53.
Deutsche Post Global Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 116 F. App'x 435, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2004)
(applying Maryland noncompete law and policy and declining to enforce an overbroad
international restriction).
54.
See, e.g., Moffat, supranote 5, at 876.
55.
See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructureof High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577
(1999) (proposing that California's ban on employee noncompetes and the resulting ease of
employee mobility is part of an advantageous legal framework that has made Silicon Valley's
economy and high levels of technological innovation possible).
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public policy of protecting worker freedom of mobility,5 6 its statutory
ban on contractual restrictions on employee mobility,5 7 and the rise of
the tech economy in the state have led to a burst of recent scholarship
that attempts to test the effect, if any, of noncompete enforcement on
various business outcomes-in other words, a so-called "California
effect."5 8 Scholars widely assume that, outside of California, firms
often use postemployment restrictive covenants for employees, 59 and
recent research demonstrates that the majority of U.S. jurisdictions
will allow some level of CNC enforcement. 60
Nonetheless, very little is understood about the actual
deployment of CNCs and other postemployment restrictions on
employee activities in modern business relationships. The extant legal
literature focuses on litigated cases and emerging policy responses to
contractual restrictions.61 In particular, legal researchers have studied
the various uses and alleged abuses of noncompete clauses. 62 This
literature includes discussions of the general and specific human
capital investment aspects of noncompetes, 63 as well as how that
understanding might be applied to a maximization of the positive
spillovers of allowing CNCs in some employment situations and not

56. The California Supreme Court has most recently reiterated the state's strong public
policy against postemployment CNCs in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293
(Cal. 2008).
57.
California's anti-employee CNC statute is CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West
2014) ("Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."). For a
detailed discussion of the serendipitous historical origins of California's ban on employee
noncompetes see Gilson, supra note 55, at 613-20.
58.
See, e.g., Garmaise, supra note 30, at 376 (assessing the effects of tough noncompetition
enforcement regimes on executive compensation and stability); Marx, et al., supra note 31, at
879-87 (examining the effects of a temporary repeal of covenant not to compete enforcement on
patent-holding employees in Michigan); supra Part I (discussing this developing area of
empirical research).
59.
See, e.g., Lester, supra note 5, at 49 (finding that CNCs "are an increasingly common
feature of employment"); see also Whitmore, supra note 5, at 494 n.67 (presenting evidence of a
growth trend in appellate decisions involving CNCs, but not directly measuring the actual
inclusion of CNCs in employee contracts).
60. See generally Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative
Enforcement of Covenant Not to Compete Agreements, Trends, and Implications for Employee
Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 753, 757 (2011) (observing that the majority of states permit
enforcement of some form of noncompetes).
61.
See, e.g., Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J.
107, 164 (2008) (commenting on the policy implications arising out of the litigation of employee
noncompete agreements).
62. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 9, at 1214-15.
See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 25, at 93 (suggesting a distinction between general and
63.
specific human capital in covenant not to compete law).
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others.64 Studies have also shown that the evolution of state
enforcement of noncompetes is trending toward greater enforcement.65
Are restrictive covenants for CEOs somehow different than
those for other employees? The CEO is an often-discussed figure that
is sometimes reviled and sometimes revered, depending on the
observer's perspective. Much of the popular debate-as well as the
policy and scholarly debates16 -surrounds the issue of executive
compensation. 67 Generally, the legal literature focuses on managerial
agency costs 68 and board capture, 69 the fiduciary duties of the officers
and directors, 70 and executive compensation in the United States 7

64.
Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing
Innovation from Employee Mobility with Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 294 (2006).
65.
See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 61, at 164. However, Professors Garrison and Wendt
also discuss how courts have seemingly scrutinized noncompete clauses more heavily in the last
decades. Id.
66.
Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything Should
Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1013 (2006).
67. Adam Davidson, C.E.O.'s Don't Need to Earn Less. They Need to Sweat More, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., June 2, 2013, at 14 (describing how CEOs are difficult "to rein in" and "are often
rewarded when they don't succeed but are not usually penalized enough when they do a
lackluster job"). The author also refers to how boards of directors share a similar problem, and
adds that:
Lucian Bebchuk, a professor at Harvard Law School and perhaps the leading
academic voice for corporate reform, told me that the problem isn't (just) greed. It's
the boards of directors . . . [which] are supposed to represent the stockholders'
interests . . . [but] . . . most public firms, where C.E.O.'s can have considerable
influence over board appointments, neuter those interests. They are structured so
that a board tends to side with its chief.

Id.
68.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 835 (2006) (discussing an example of inadequate board
oversight of a CEO and self-interest from the case of Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989)).
69.
Posner, supra note 66, at 1018. In his initial critique of CEO oversight, Judge Posner
concludes that:
Of all the employees of a corporation, the CEO poses the greatest challenge to the
control issue. His performance is especially difficult to evaluate because of the
uncertainty that surrounds success in business. And his only "supervisor" is the board
of directors because management's advantages in proxy fights prevent shareholders
from influencing the compensation policies adopted by the board-and the board, as
we shall see, is an unreliable agent of the principal (the shareholders). Even if the
literature on performance-based evaluation of corporate executives yielded a reliable
method of evaluating the performance of CEOs of large corporations, boards of
directors would be unlikely to force it on the CEO.

Id.
70. See, e.g., Muir & Schipani, supra note 33, at 444-57 (focusing on the duty of loyalty to
the firm); Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board
Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers' FiduciaryDuties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 849 (2011)
(noting that "recent Delaware court decisions have given new life to officers' fiduciary duties");
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and other countries. 7 2 However, the actual duties and competitive
restrictions contained in CEO contracts are less understood.73
Nonetheless, a CEO's central role in a public company must be
appreciated to understand the importance of his or her employment
contract to the firm. As the top officer of the firm, the CEO reports
only to the board of directors and oversees the rest of the company's
employees. 74 The CEO is a highly valuable employee and possesses
sought-after skills that set him or her apart in a very competitive
marketplace for managerial talent. 75 This unique position at the top of
the firm's governance structure allows the CEO access to all of the
firm's proprietary information, trade secrets, customer and supplier
relationships, product cost structures, research and development
information, and strategic plans.76 While other key employees have
knowledge of important corporate information, only the CEO will have
unfettered access to nearly every aspect of the business and its
strategic direction. As a result, the CEO is the employee who can most
harm the company if he or she leaves the firm to work for a
competitor. Accordingly, CEO and other executive employment
contracts may contain a variety of sophisticated restrictive covenants
designed to warn the executive about the consequences of any

see also LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 22, at 78-89 (explaining various legal obligations,
particularly the fiduciary duties of the board and executives).
71. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 23-44; see also David I. Walker, The Challenge of
Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 436-37 (2010) (describing
the debates around executive pay and the portfolio of possible regulatory proposals).
72. See Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1189-1260 (2004) (discussing various theories related to
the justifications for CEO pay differentials across borders). For another comparative study of
CEO contract provisions, see Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas,
ComparingCEO Employment Contract Provisions:Differences Between Australia and the United
States, 64 VAND. L. REV. 559, 594 tbl. 2 (2011).
73. The notable exception is Schwab & Thomas, supra note 19, at 254-57.
74. See MACEY, supra note 23, at 51-53, 59-60.
75. See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 42, at 762:
A successful CEO of a large public company undoubtedly possesses a rare combination
of skills and instincts. The CEO must manage an organization with a large number of
employees, provide the strategic direction for the firm, and decide when or whether
the company should acquire other firms or be acquired. Individuals who possess the
necessary attributes might be scarce and competition among firms, particularly for
rising stars, might be intense. Of course, compensation is not the only factor in
attracting and retaining talent at the very top of the corporate pyramid, but it is an
important one.
(footnote omitted).
76. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 66, at 1015-20.
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disloyalty during employment and to provide recourse for the firm
should the CEO ever leave and wish to compete against it.77
How valuable to firms are restrictive covenants in CEO
employment agreements? One recent high-profile example illustrates
how a company may incur great expense to ensure it faces no
competition from a departing executive. In this situation, General
Electric's ("GE") vice-chairman retired after nearly thirty years of
service to the company and received a combined retirement and
severance package from the company.7 8 The executive's combined
package included an $89,000 per month payment for ten years, as well
as stock options, a bonus, and other forthcoming pension benefits
worth an estimated $28.3 million dollars. The compensation
recognized both recognized the executive's retirement and that he
bargained for "an agreement not to join a GE competitor anywhere in
the world for three years."7 9 A GE spokeswoman explained that the
executive's "retirement terms reflect his senior position, long service,
and significant contribution to GE as well as our interest in receiving
strong noncompete and nonsolicitation agreement protections."8 0
Thus, while it is difficult to break out the value of the competitive
restrictions from the overall value of the executive's retirement
package, GE seems to have attached substantial value to controlling
its information and human capital investments in the executive
following his departure.
Overall, there are two realities about CEOs that we would
expect to drive how and how often their employers negotiate CNCs.
First, the CEO has greater bargaining power in the employment
relationship than most employees. Because a CEO could likely reject
any less-than-serious efforts by the company to impose a standard
CNC clause, we would expect substantial variation in the presence, or
absence, of these clauses in CEO contracts. On the other hand, the

77.
For an example of a high-profile matter involving a former CEO and board member's
noncompete dispute with a successor entity, see David Armstrong, What Does a Noncompete Pact
Truly Bar? Nasty Row Sorts It Out-Iron Mountain Fires an Official, Then Uses Sleuths to See if
He's Becoming Its Rival, WALL ST. J., Jun. 14, 2004, at Al (discussing allegations that the former
executive took steps to start a competing entity while still a board member and during a
noncompete period after being fired from his position), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB108716323273035767. While this case ended in an arbitration award in favor of the
former executive, the facts of the rancorous dispute are also recalled in a related lawsuit. See
Iron Mountain Inc. v. Carr, NO. 05-10890-RCL, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98655, at *6-11 (D. Mass.
Mar. 13, 2006).
78.
Kate Linebaugh & Joann S. Lublin, For Retiring GE Executive, $89,000 a Month Not to
Work, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2012, at Bl.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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company is more likely to bargain for a CNC in a CEO contract than
in other employment contracts because the company fears greater
economic harm from postemployment competition by a CEO than by
other employees. With the CEO's bargaining power pitted against the
company's enhanced desire for restrictive clauses, we would also
expect to find significant contractual tradeoffs between CEOs and
firms over the clauses' contents.8 1
B. NondisclosureAgreements and Other Restrictions
In many employment contracts, the new employee may also
find that along with a noncompete, the firm wants him or her to agree
to other restrictions during and after the employment relationship.
These promises are often related to confidentiality and nondisclosure
of proprietary information, soliciting other employees to leave and
compete, and working with or for former clients.8 2 Other mechanisms
that serve as disincentives to leaving a firm for new employment
opportunities with a competitor include agreements related to
contingent compensation and benefitS 83 and, more recently, garden
leave provisions. In addition, in all states, a duly protected and
eligible business secret 84 will give rise to trade secret protection, and,

81. See Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Kanas, 871 F. Supp. 2d 520, 533-34 (E.D. Va. 2012). In
Kanas, two former bank executives had their CNCs enforced, in part because the court felt
confident that concerns of equity and fairness in the bargaining process were not a bar to
enforcement with these high-level employees. Id. at 538. The court discussed this issue as
follows:
Defendants were executives of a publically traded company, responsible for growing
North Fork from a small town bank to a corporate behemoth which they would sell to
Capital One for $13.2 billion and net the Defendants upwards of $150 million. Beyond
[Defendants'] business sophistication, they also received the advice of counsel while
negotiating the Separation Agreement. Like their clients, the Defendants' counsel was
at the pinnacle of sophistication. Counsel hailed from a preeminent law firm and
specialized in executive compensation. Finally, there is no debate that the
Defendants, unlike the typical employee, stood "on equal footing at the bargaining
table" with their employer.
Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
82. See e.g., Stone, supra note 5, at 578.
83.
See Abigail Shechtman Nicandri, Comment, The Growing Disfavor of Non-Compete
Agreements in the New Economy and Alternative Approaches for Protecting Employers'
ProprietaryInformationand Trade Secrets, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1003, 1003-04 (2011) (cataloging
the alternatives to CNCs as the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, garden leave agreements, forfeiture-for-competition and the
employee-choice doctrine, "no-poach" agreements, and no-fault poaching truces or "fair-poaching"
agreements).
84. See, for example, M-I LLC v. Stelly, 733 F. Supp. 2d 759, 772-73 (S.D. Tex. 2010),
where the court describes the Uniform Trade Secrets Act application in Texas law concerning the
elements of a misappropriation of trade secrets claim, where a plaintiff must show:
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in a handful of states, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure may
provide further employer protection.8 5 Employers often reinforce these
two default protections by including contractual language that the
employee must overtly acknowledge.
Of these possible restrictive covenants and mobility
disincentives beyond a CNC, perhaps the most important one is the
nondisclosure agreement, also called a confidentiality agreement. Like
CNCs, it is assumed that these secrecy clauses are widely and
increasingly used in employment contracts of all types.8 6 Unlike a
CNC, a standalone NDA does not necessarily restrict an employee's
mobility options. The employee can still move to a competitor, but the
information remains exclusively with the last employer and cannot be
disclosed or, theoretically, ever used despite being embedded in the
employee's memory.8 7
Moreover, the relative ease of securing and enforcing an NDA
brings additional advantages over a CNC, which tends to be more
controversial even when CNCs are generally enforceable in a given
jurisdiction.88 Professors Dworkin and Callahan discuss the
advantages of NDAs for employers at length, finding that NDAs, in
contrast to CNCs, "are enforceable even in states in which anti-

(1) a trade secret existed, (2) the trade secret was acquired through a breach of a
confidential relationship or discovered by improper means, and (3) the defendant used
the trade secret without authorization from the plaintiff. A trade secret is defined as a
"formula, pattern, device or compilation of information used in a business, which gives
the owner an opportunity to obtain an advantage over his competitors who do not
know or use it."
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
85.
See, e.g., Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?: New Empirical Evidence
Reveals the Economic Harm of Non-Compete Covenants, REGULATION, Winter 2010-2011, at 6, 79 (adapted from Alan Hyde, IntellectualProperty Justificationsfor Restricting Employee Mobility:
A Critical Appraisal in Light of the Economic Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 357 (Michael L. Wachter & Cynthia L.

Estlund eds., 2012).
86.
See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 152-53 (noting that as these clauses seem
to be increasingly used there is also a movement toward more employee disclosure through
encouraging appropriate whistleblowing); see also James C. Bruno & David C. Hissong,
Enforcement of Non-DisclosureAgreements: Does MCLA 445.1901 and Related Case Law Apply
in Other States?, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2002, at 58, 58 (explaining how, pursuant to the Michigan
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, "Michigan companies often propose NDAs that have no time,
geographic, or scope limitations because Michigan law generally permits the complete
prohibition on the disclosure of a party's trade secrets by a third party"), available at
http://www.michbar.org/ journal/pdfl pdf4article375.pdf., archived at http://perma.cc/8A3J-JA7J.
87. See Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 13.
88. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 156-58 (discussing the options for employers to
protect their valuable information and concluding "the law well equips an employer who seeks to
keep information about its affairs secure").
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competition clauses are prohibited." 89 Moreover, they find that
"[c]oncerns regarding restraint of trade are much less directly
implicated in this context; restrictions on access to information, rather
than employee movement, are involved . .. [t]hus, the policy in favor
90
Confidentiality
of freedom of contract is given precedence."
in
comparison to
to
enforce
easy
agreements are also relatively
noncompetes, and NDAs have other advantages, such as being "an
unambiguous declaration that the employer views firm matters as
91
confidential" and an additional basis for a breach of contract claim.
NDAs are permissible even in states like California where
92
employee noncompete agreements are banned or difficult to enforce.
As a practical matter, state common law will prohibit an employee
from disclosing an employer's confidential information, even without a
written NDA between the parties. 93 Like in the case of CNC
enforcement, states require that the restrictions in an NDA are
reasonable in scope and tailored to protect legitimate business
interests. 94 In practice, restrictive covenants and their various
prohibitions can also be jumbled together within a contract,
essentially making the confidentiality agreements part of an
5
employee's general noncompete terms.9 Beyond determining if the
contemplated confidential information addressed by the NDA is
covered by a state's trade-secret protections (in other words, if it is a
trade secret pursuant to a state's version of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act), some states will specifically evaluate NDAs under a CNC-like

89.
Id. at 156-57.
Id. (citations omitted).
90.
91. Id. at 157.
92. See Bruno & Hissong, supra note 86, at 58 (discussing California's "strong public policy
against [CNCs]" but enforcement of NDAs).
93. See, e.g., Laro Maint. Corp. v. Culkin, 700 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491-92 (App. Div. 1999); Royal
Carbo Corp. v. Flameguard, Inc., 645 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (App. Div. 1996) (discussing New York's
common law on employee confidentiality and fair competition, including after the termination of
employment). In addition, third parties, such as attorneys or other professionals, may have some
liability for aiding an employee's breach of an NDA. See Maura I. Strassberg, An Ethical Rabbit
Hole: Model Rule 4.4, Intentional Interference with Former Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements
and the Threat of Disqualification, Part II, 90 NEB. L. REV. 141, 182-83 (2011) (examining the
issue of attorney disqualification in instances where counsel participates in the breach of a
confidentiality agreement).
94. See, e.g., Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 762-63 (Iowa 1999)
(considering whether the NDA was "reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer's
business" or "unreasonably restrictive of the employee's rights").
See, e.g., Thiesing v. Detsply Int'l, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 932, 951-52 (E.D. Wisc. 2010)
95.
(modifying the terms and definition of confidential information included in employee restrictive
covenants to make the noncompete enforceable).
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reasonableness test,9 6 albeit with less concern on limiting the scope of

the restriction.9 7
Nonetheless, NDAs are a useful contractual safeguard (much
like CNCs) for an employer's confidential information, ostensibly
supplementing noncontractual safeguards like existing state-level
trade-secret
protections
and fiduciary
duties to maintain
confidentiality. In one sense, NDAs are useful from a human capital
investment perspective because, like CNCs, they can encourage
information sharing between principals and their agents.9 8 These
agreements also need not have a stated time limit to be enforced in

96.
See, e.g., Revere, 595 N.W.2d at 761-63. In Revere, the Iowa Supreme Court examined a
confidentiality clause in an employment agreement as an issue of first impression and
consequently reviewed other states' approaches on the issue of NDAs. Id. at 761. The court
concluded that:
[T]he following test should be applied in determining whether a nondisclosureconfidential or invention assignment agreement is enforceable:
(1) Is the restriction prohibiting disclosure reasonably necessary for the protection of
the employer's business;
(2) is the restriction unreasonably restrictive of the employee's rights; and
(3) is the restriction prejudicial to the public interest?
Id. at 762.
Further, the court noted that "[t]his test is obviously the same as that used to determine the
enforceability of a noncompete agreement." Id. Nonetheless, "the absence of restrictions
concerning time or geographic location do not render a nondisclosure-confidentiality, [sic]
agreement presumptively unenforceable . . . because the inquiry whether the nondisclosure
agreement unreasonably restricts the employee's rights would address the breadth of the
restrictions regarding disclosure." Id.
97.
See, for example, Coady v. Harpo, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 244, 250-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999),
where the court enforced an NDA with an unlimited scope because it did not significantly hinder
the employment activities of a former senior associate producer for the Oprah Winfrey Show. The
court rejected arguments that the NDA was too broad in these circumstances because it "remains
effective for all time and with no geographical boundaries"; the court stated that, "[w]hether for
better or for worse, interest in a celebrity figure and his or her attendant business and personal
ventures somehow seems to continue endlessly, even long after death, and often, as in the
present case, extends over an international domain." Id. The court further distinguished the
NDA enforcement from other restrictive covenants:
Unlike the traditional line of restrictive covenant cases, the confidentiality agreement
at issue in the instant case does not impose any of the typical restrictions commonly
adjudicated in restrictive covenant cases. Defendant does not seek to restrain
plaintiffs future career. Plaintiff is free to choose her future occupation, the locale in
which she may choose to work, and the time when she can commence her new career.
Defendant does not object to plaintiff becoming a journalist, competing with defendant
in the same venue and in any locale, including Chicago, and in beginning her new
venture immediately. The confidentiality agreement does not restrict commerce and
does not restrict plaintiffs ability to work in any chosen career field, at any time.
Instead, the 1995 confidentiality agreement restricts plaintiffs ability to disseminate
confidential information that she obtained or learned while in defendant's employ.
Id. at 250.
98. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 157 (describing advantages of confidentiality
agreements relative to "non-contractual safeguards").
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many states, 99 but if the clause is not time limited, then some states
will find the confidentiality agreement unenforceable with regard to
information that is not otherwise a protectable trade secret. 0 0 In
effect, employers use NDAs to attempt to extend an employee's duty of
confidentiality related to information that would not otherwise be
protected trade secrets. Examples of confidential information that
might not qualify for trade secret protection include the names of a
firm's customers that are not otherwise publically available, suppliers,
and strategic plans.' 0
It is understandable that a firm would want to protect its
competitive advantage by limiting the use of its valuable business
information by a former employee who moves to a competitor. NDAs
are nonetheless subject to criticism. For example, some scholars argue
that NDAs can be antithetical to good public policy when an employer
uses the contract terms as a pretext to silence otherwise valid whistleblowing activity.1 02 Others have suggested that increased workplace
transparency can be a new source of protection for employees. 10 These
same scholars, by implication, disfavor the secrecy that comes with

NDAs.
Many questions remain about the use and propriety of CNCs
and NDAs: Are these restrictions on otherwise lawful free competition
essential instruments for the protection and encouragement of an
employer's investment in the human capital of its employees and the
protection of its hard-earned competitive advantage? Or, in contrast,
are these agreements legal cover for an employer's abusive
overreaching through contracts of adhesion that seriously curtail
employees' freedom of choice and mobility, as well as harm
competition, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity? If these
restrictive covenants have a place in managing the employment

99. See, e.g., Coady, 719 N.E.2d at 250-51 (recognizing that a confidentiality agreement
scheduled to remain effective indefinitely was reasonable and enforceable).
100. See, e.g., Atl. Bread Co. Int'l v. Lupton-Smith, 663 S.E.2d 743, 748 (2008), affd, 679
S.E.2d 722 (2009) (explaining Georgia's approach to open-ended time limitations in
confidentiality agreements).
101. See, e.g., Coady, 719 N.E.2d at 250:
Postemployment restrictive covenants typically involve agreements by a past
employee not to compete with the business of her former employer, not to solicit
clients or customers of her former employer, and not to disseminate trade secrets of
her former employer. The covenants in these typical cases are carefully scrutinized
because Illinois courts abhor restraints on trade.
102. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 43, at 179-86 (discussing the public policy and
practical reasons not to enforce an NDA in certain circumstances).
103. See Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 351, 364-66 (2010) (theorizing that mandatory disclosure of terms and conditions of
employment provide additional protection beyond that of traditional employment contracts).
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relationship, human capital investment, and business knowledge
diffusion, should only certain types of key employees be allowed to
bargain away their future freedom of mobility? When these
restrictions are present, what do they tell us about a firm's valuable
information and fear of competition?
Since employment contracts are not generally publicly
available, researchers have been unable to examine these issues
empirically. Taking advantage of the public availability of CEO
employment contracts filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, we turn next to an empirical analysis of their contents to
inform the debate.
III. DATA COLLECTION, DESCRIPTION, AND METHODOLOGY
To create our sample, we began by randomly selecting a sample
of 500 S&P 1500 public corporations. These companies are subject to
the federal securities laws' periodic disclosure requirements and are
required to disclose any employment contracts that they have entered
into with their CEOs.1 0 4 As shown in Table 1 below, our initial sample
of 500 firms had 2,109 potential CEO contracts over the time period
running from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2010.105 By potential
CEO contracts, we mean that the sample companies had named CEOs
in their disclosures that could have had, and in most cases did have,
written employment contracts with their employers.
Each named CEO is counted as having at least one potential
contract with the firm. There are more potential contracts than firms
because over this fifteen-year period some firms had several CEOs and
each CEO may or may not have had a contract with the firm.1 06
Furthermore, for CEOs that had contracts, some had an initial
contract with their firm ("Initial Contract"), subsequently entered into
a second contract amending the Initial Contract ("Contract
Amendment"), and then later entered into a further contract that
restated (and sometimes made additional amendments to) the terms
of their Initial Contract ("Restated Contract"). Our initial sample
counts each of these as a separate contract.

104. Randall Thomas, Erin O'Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in CEO
Employment Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 959, 977
(2010).
105. We use the SEC's EDGAR database for corporate disclosures as our basic source for all
of these contracts. Beginning January 1, 1996, all registered U.S. corporations have been
required to make electronic disclosures using the EDGAR database.
106. In a small number of cases, firms changed names during the sample period, but we
continued to treat these successor firms as the original firms.
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Table 1. Description of CEO Contracts in Initial Sample:
1996-2010
Description

Total

Initial entries for potential CEO contracts
Less: "Implicit" contracts (entries for companies whose CEO does not have a
written contract)
Less: Contract amendments
Less: Missing contracts
Less: Companies that could not be found on Compustat

2,109
673

Net usable explicit contracts

474
75
13

874

Having determined the total number of potential contracts (2,109),
we subtracted from our sample several different categories of data
that are not relevant to our study or which we were unable to collect.
First, we set aside all 673 CEOs that potentially could have entered
into, but did not enter into, an "explicit" employment contract with
their firms for at least some portion of their employments. These
potential and nonobservable contracts that we excluded are an
interesting sample of "implicit" contracts, which is a category of
agreements that other researchers have already examined to address
the question of why some CEOs do not have explicit employment
contracts with their firms. 107 In contrast to the implicit contract
examples, we define explicit contracts as the observable employment
contract terms, expressed in written form, that contain any
information on the negotiated relationship between the parties. 0 8
In this paper, we focus on examining CEOs that have explicit
employment contracts of some sort and determining when those
contracts include CNC clauses or other competitive restrictions. 109 We
107. See Stuart L. Gillan, et al., Explicit Versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO
Employment Agreements, 64 J. FIN. 1629, 1654 (2009) (finding that fewer than half of the S&P
500 firms studied had what the authors define as comprehensive "explicit" contracts).
108. Notably, our definition of what constitutes an explicit contract is seemingly broaderand thus more inclusive-than Gillan, et al.'s, because that study only includes written contracts
that are deemed "comprehensive," which still excludes some contracts containing CNCs. See id.
at 1629. In Gillan, et al., the contracts excluded "had either no written agreement at all or
agreements that covered only limited aspects of their relationship with the CEO, such as change
of control, nondisclosure, noncompete, or nonsolicitation agreements. These latter firms and
their CEOs relied on implicit [employment agreements] through which the CEO was employed at
will." Id. (emphasis in original).
109. Since we are concerned with the content of the contractual relationship, even if it is
limited in scope, we capture written contracts that Gillan, et al. would have excluded as not
"comprehensive" enough to provide useable evidence. In addition, we look at a sample of S&P
1500 companies, and the rates of usable contracts are comparable across both studies. Gillan, et
al. report that only approximately 37% of their sample are usable explicit contracts. See id. at
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study explicit contracts because these observable agreements are the
only ones that we can code. By their nature, these written agreements
provide evidence of the negotiations between the firms and CEOs that
we are studying. In theory, we could treat the implicit contracts in the
sample as lacking a CNC or any other restriction.11 0 However, the
reasons that the parties did not memorialize the contract in writing
are potentially so varied that relating that choice to some cognizable
statement about the CEO's freedom to engage in postemployment
competition seems unsupportable in the absence of other evidence.'
We also chose to eliminate the Contract Amendments from the
sample. These documents are amendments to an existing employment
contract and do not restate the prior contract. They, almost
universally, are very short documents that contain relatively minor
changes to an existing contract, such as changing the specified base
salary of the CEO. There were no Contract Amendments in our
sample that affected the presence or absence of a CNC clause, so we
decided that they did not add any pertinent information to our
study.1 12 Next, we excluded from our sample all those contracts that
companies stated they had entered into but that we could not find
attached to any of the companies' securities filings. 113 Where
companies disclosed the existence of a contract, we searched every
filing within a two-year period after the date of the contract for
contracts entered into after the effective date for mandatory EDGAR
filings (January 1, 1996). Thus, we believe that most of the 75 cases
where we did not find a contract are likely the result of the company
failing to file the contract as required by law. 114 In any event, the

&

1636-37. Our more inclusive sample finds that approximately 41% of CEO contracts across our
entire period have explicit usable contracts. Moreover, Gillan, et al. find that approximately 64%
of their explicit contracts had a CNC. Id. at 1639. This rate is lower than the rates that we report
in Table 2. See infra Table 2.
110. Moreover, the absence of any evidence of a written employment agreement for a term is
not necessarily dispositive of the absence of a noncompete. See, e.g., Tracy L. Staidl, The
Enforceability of Noncompetition Agreements when Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the
Analysis, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 95, 101-08 (1998) (explaining the requirement of adequate
consideration to support a CNC in many states).
111. We intend to analyze the reasons why some companies use explicit contracts while
others prefer implicit contracts in later work.
112. This approach is consistent with two of the authors' prior work. See Thomas, O'Hara,
Martin, supra note 104, at 978.
113. For future researchers' interest, we note that companies are not required to attach
these contracts to any particular filing. Therefore, finding them can be a time-consuming and
difficult process. Most companies disclosed them as attachments to their Forms 10-K, but we also
routinely found them as exhibits to a host of other securities filings.
114. To address this problem, the SEC should clarify its disclosure rules on this issue to
specify where companies attach these contracts. Logically, they should be attached as an exhibit
to the companies' Form 10-K filings.
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difficulty in finding these contracts seems a likely explanation for why
few researchers have previously mined these sorts of documents for
clues about the contractual relationships between executives and their
employers.
Finally, in thirteen instances we were unable to locate the
named company in the Compustat database, which we used to supply
several important pieces of information about the sample companies.
Accordingly, we excluded those contracts. This left us with a sample of
874 Initial Contracts and Restated Contracts for our analysis.
We next hand coded each of the contracts. 15 We first identified
the contracting parties and other aspects of the general employment
contract, such as the contract's date of execution and its length. Next,
we coded the agreements for the terms related to prohibitions on
competition during and after employment. We also coded provisions
relating to nonsolicitation of employees and clients, as well as all
nondisclosure provisions. These are discussed further in Part IV
below.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis started with a description of the
contracts and the other variables that we compiled for our sample.
Table 2 shows the year that each CEO contract was entered into for
the 874 contracts. The table shows the total number of sample
contracts per year, the number of initial versus restated contracts, and
the number and percentage of contracts per year that contain CNC
clauses.11 6

115. The full coding manual we developed as a framework for this research is on file with
the authors.
116. For a unique glimpse of the use of otherwise private contracts of a range of employees
at a major public company, the discovery record of executive CNC disputes sheds light on IBM's
"Noncompetition Program." See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 399 (LAP), 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), aff'd, 437 Fed. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011).
Pretrial transcripts reveal the size and scope of CNCs and recoupment provisions common at
that prominent company:
IBM requires over 1700 employees to sign noncompetition agreements. More than 300
IBM employees are required to sign a form noncompetition agreement identical to the
one signed by Defendant. IBM did not negotiate the terms of these agreements, and
historically the agreements were not modified. IBM's noncompetition program works
in tandem with a "clawback" mechanism. If an employee violates the noncompetition
agreement, IBM can choose to invoke the clawback mechanism and cancel all of that
employee's unvested and unexercised equity grants. IBM can also require employees
to repay IBM for the equity options the employee has exercised and redeemed within
the last two years.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Table 2. Time Series of Explicit CEO Contracts:
1996-2010 (N =874)

Year
1996
1997
1998

Total
Contracts
66
69
89

Initial
Explicit
Contracts
51
58
66

Restated
Explicit
Contracts
15
11
23

Explicit
Contracts
with CNC
Clauses
50
53
72

Percent of
Explicit
Contracts with
CNC Clauses
75.8
76.8
80.9

1999

78

64

14

60

76.9

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

69
81
53
47
42
54
43

53
63
45
32
38
45
35

16
18
8
15
4
9
8

50
64
42
39
32
46
36

72.5
79.0
79.2
83.0
76.2
85.2
83.7

2007
2008
2009

49
72
29

36
32
17

13
40
12

40
64
25

81.6
88.9
86.2

2010

33

24

9

26

78.8

Total

874

659

215

699

1996-

371

292

79

285

80.0
76.8

503

367

136

414

82.3

2000
20012010

Overall, 80% of the contracts contain CNC clauses, although
the annual average percentage ranged from 72.5% to 88.9%.117 We
note that over time the proportion per year of contracts containing
CNC clauses increased. To determine if there is a statistically
significant increase over the sample period, we did a simple linear
regression of the percent of contracts with CNC clauses against the
year they were signed. The results indicate that the time trend is
statistically significant.1 1 8 Moreover, as the bottom rows of the table

117. Our findings are consistent with the approximately 72% of executive CNCs found by
Garmaise, supra note 30, at 379, but they are more specific to CEOs, more discretely categorized
by year, and coded for greater details as to the actual terms of the noncompete and other
restrictive covenants.
118. The coefficient on the year variable has a t-statistic of 3.00, which is significant at the
.001 level.
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show, when we compare the 1996-2000 time period to the 2001-2010
decade, we see that a greater percentage of contracts contained CNCs
in the last ten years.
We next looked more closely at the CNC clauses to see when
they apply. In Table 3, we divide these results into three mutually
exclusive categories: postemployment CNC clause only, CNC clause
only during the period of the employment contract, and no CNC
clause.
Table 3. Explicit Contracts with CNC Clauses
CNC During
Employment
Only

Postemployment
CNC

Total

No CNC Clause

Number of
628

Explicit

71

175

8.1

20.0

874

Contracts
71.9

Percent of
Total Contracts

_

I

100.0
I

I

For the full sample of 874 contracts, Table 3 shows that almost
72% (628 contracts) have CNC clauses that restrict only the CEO's
postemployment activities. By comparison, only 8.1% (71 contracts)
have CNC clauses that act solely to restrict the CEOs activities during
employment. Finally, 20% (175 contracts) do not include CNC clauses.
A. Why Do CEOs Have Competitive Restrictions in Their Contracts?
Theory suggests that the rational employer will seek the
broadest protections allowable in its jurisdiction.1 19 Generally, what is
protectable is defined by a common-law reasonableness test where
courts scrutinize the terms of the restriction on anticompetitiveness
grounds and balance the business interests at stake against the
employee's interests. 12 0 For instance, court records indicate the
pervasiveness of restrictive covenant use in certain firms and for
specific types of workers. 12 1 The international cosmetics firm Estee
Lauder brought a lawsuit against Shashi Batra, a highly compensated
former executive. 122 Estee Lauder accused Mr. Batra of moving to a

119. See Posner, Triantis & Triantis, supra note 25, at 3.
120. For discussion of noncompete enforcement, see supra Part II.A.
121. See, e.g., Visentin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at *4 (noting that over 1,700 IBM
employees were asked to sign some form of restrictive covenant).
122. Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 158-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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competitor and soliciting other managers in violation of his
multilayered restrictive covenants. 123 The court record reveals that the
firm paid a large signing bonus of $100,000 in consideration of the
agreements and that Estee Lauder asks all its employees to sign
similar restrictions.1 24 These records show that "the evidence
demonstrates that restrictive covenants are common in the prestige
cosmetics industry."1 25 In this case, the court found that a twelvemonth noncompete was reasonable and that "the risk of Batra's loss of
livelihood [was] entirely mitigated by the fact that Estee Lauder
[would] continue to pay Batra his salary of $375,000 per year for the
duration of the 'sitting out' period" and because he was also permitted
to receive compensation from noncompeting employment during that
period.1 26
We begin by examining whether a prior CEO's contract with
the company, or the current CEO's prior contract, included a CNC
clause and how that relates to the inclusion of a CNC clause in a later
contract. We undertake this analysis to determine all of the factors
that may influence the company's decision to include a noncompete
clause in a subsequent CEO employment contract. One important
reason may be path dependence: that is, that the company has
included a CNC clause in prior CEO or other executive contracts127
or even all employees' contracts1 28-and therefore, the company
subsequently includes such a clause in the new agreement. 129
123. Id. at 162-65.
124. Id. at 162. In explaining the facts of the case, the court summed up the underlying
compensation in support of the employee's contract terms:
At the commencement of his employment, Batra [the senior executive] signed an
employment agreement with Estee Lauder, which contained confidentiality, nonsolicitation, non-competition provisions. In return for signing the agreement (which
all Estee Lauder employees are required to sign) Batra received a $100,000 signing
bonus. In addition, Batra was provided with a compensation package of $300,000 per
year, benefits, an automobile allowance, stock options, and bonus eligibility. On July
1, 2004, Batra's base salary was increased to $325,000. In July, 2005, in conjunction
with his new responsibilities for [a subsidiary], Estee Lauder increased Batra's base
salary to $375,000.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations to transcripts omitted).
125. Id. at 182.
126. Id.
127. For example, some companies have a blanket policy that all senior managers or highlevel executives must agree to restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Visentin,
No. 11 Civ. 399 (LAP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15342, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), aff'd, 437
Fed. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011) (describing IBM's noncompetition program).
128. In one reported example, a large international firm asks all of its employees-even
when the employee is based in California-to sign a restrictive covenant. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d
at 162.
129. As an example of why this would happen, one can imagine that if the company's
counsel drafts the initial version of the new contract, he or she would simply mark up the prior
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To go beyond anecdotal evidence in reported cases about how
companies use restrictive covenants for certain employees and to test
for path dependence with these covenants, Table 4 separates out the
513 instances in which a company had at least two CEO contracts in
our sample (regardless of whether the same CEO was party to
multiple contracts). 13 o

'

Table 4. CNC in Prior Explicit CEO Contract'3
CNC in Prior

No CNC in Prior

Total
(Percent of Grand

Contract

Contract

Total)

in Pior

CNC in Subsequent
Contract
No CNC in
Subsequent
Contract
Total
(Percent of Grand
Total)

in

rior

385

38

423
(82.5)

25

65

410
(80.3)

103
(19.7)

90
(17.5)
513
(100.0)

We find both a CNC in the prior contract and a CNC in the
subsequent contract in 385 cases. In another 38 cases where we had
more than one contract for a company, the company did not have a
CNC clause in a prior contract but did have a CNC clause in the later
contract. Finally, of the remaining cases, 65 involved situations where
there was no CNC in the prior contract or in the current contract. The
final 25 companies included a CNC in an earlier contract but not a
subsequent contract.
To determine if there is a statistical relationship between the
presence of a CNC in a prior contract and its presence in a subsequent
contract, we used a contingency table approach and calculated a chisquare statistic, 24.33, which is significantly different from zero at the
.0001 level.1 32 In other words, this finding is consistent with our
contract without changing an existing CNC clause. Subsequent renewal negotiations with the
same CEO or with a new CEO candidate might not change the initial language sufficiently to
remove the CNC clause.
130. Here we are examining the relationship across contracts with the same firm, not the
individual CEOs, to better understand the path dependence of these particular contract terms.
131. This table includes only observations with at least two sample contracts per company
but does not include the first contract.
132. To analyze count data, such as that in Table 4, we employ a contingency table
approach. This approach tests the classification of data according to whether a CNC is in the
prior contract and whether the sample contract that contains a CNC is independent. The
appropriate test statistic for such a test is a chi-square test. If the p-value associated with the
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hypothesis that the presence of a CNC in an earlier contract will lead
to a CNC showing up in a subsequent contract at the same firm.
We next considered whether a contract's term is a significant
predictor of a CNC.1 33 We hypothesized that contracts binding the
parties for a longer period of time are more likely to include CNC
clauses. Our reasoning is that the longer the CEO is expected to be
with the firm, the more valuable knowledge that he or she will have
acquired. This knowledge would be potentially harmful to the
employer if the CEO were to go to work for a competing firm, hence
the need for greater protection in the form of a CNC clause.
Table 5 breaks out the distribution of the length of the CEO
contracts separately for the full sample of contracts and then for the
subsample of contracts that contain a CNC clause. We include rows for
contracts where the contract length is not mentioned or the
relationship is at will, or is for an indefinite period (142 contracts);1 34
the contract expires when the CEO is terminated (59 contracts); the
contract's length is tied to the CEO reaching retirement age or retiring
(6 contracts); or where the contract states it is for a definite term but
the length is actually unspecified (1 contract). We then grouped
contracts with stated terms by their lengths in years. We selected year
intervals to create a manageable number of rows.

chi-square test statistic is smaller than a critical level, say .10, then we reject the null hypothesis
of independence between the classifications at that level of significance. WILLIAM MENDENHALL
& JAMES E. REINMUTH, STATISTICS FOR MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 471-85 (2d ed. 1974).
133. We recognize that the interpretation of contract length can be uncertain because
contracts that are for even a lengthy term may be accompanied by liberal termination provisions
elsewhere in the employment contract that give an employer wide discretion to end the
employment at nearly any moment. See, e.g., Schwab & Thomas, supra note 19, at 246-48. On
the other hand, contracts with no term or a relatively short term can still continue indefinitely in
the sense that the parties are free to continue the employment relationship going forward. It is
also the case that CEO contracts of any length are often renewed multiple times. Nonetheless, in
the context of CEOs, the stated length of a contract is still credible evidence of the parties' intent
at the conclusion of negotiations. We, therefore, use the stated length of the contract-or a lack
of a stated term-as a useful variable to understand what the parties value and are willing to
accept with regard to the CEO's expected tenure at the firm.
134. In each of these cases, the contract has an effective length of zero so we group them
together.

2015]

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NONCOMPETES

33

Table 5. Length of Explicit CEO Contracts that Include
CNC Clauses
Contract Length
Length not
mentioned/At-

Total Number
of Contracts

Number of
Contracts with
CNC Clause

Percent of
Contracts with
CNC Clause

142

92

64.8

59

41

69.5

6

1

16.7

1
71
102
288
58
110
37
874

1
53
88
248
49
94
32
699

100.0
74.7
86.3
86.1
84.5
85.5
86.5
80.0

will/Indefinite period

Until CEO quits or is
terminated
Until CEO reaches
retirement age or retires
Contract length missing
0 < Length:5 1 year
1 < Length 5 2 years
2 < Length 5 3 years
3 < Length:5 4 years
4 < Length:5 5 years
Length > 5 years
Total

These data suggest that longer employment contracts are more
likely to include CNC clauses. For example, for short-term contracts
that expire within one year, only roughly 74.7% have CNC clauses.
Similarly, only 64.8% of indefinite length contracts, at-will contracts,
and contracts that do not mention length-all of which have effective
lengths of zero-have CNC clauses. In sum, 67.4% of all short or zeroterm contracts have CNC clauses. By contrast, 85.9% of the longer
term contracts, those that are more than one year in length, have
CNC clauses. This is a statistically significant difference, which
provides evidence of a positive relationship between the length of a
contract and the existence of a CNC clause in the contract. The
average length of contracts that contain a CNC clause is 30.56
months, whereas the average length is just 20.24 months in contracts
lacking a CNC. The t-value, derived from a t-test of this difference, is
5.63, which is statistically significant at the .01 level.
Prior research has found that the enforceability of CNC clauses
varies across states,1 35 which is an issue of keen importance to

135. See generally Bishara, supra note 60, at 756-57 ("[Sltate law . . . related to
noncompetes varies such that the enforceability of a post-employment restriction on an
employee's mobility will be uncertain.").
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practitioners.1 3 6 We, therefore, hypothesized that a further factor that

may influence the inclusion of a CNC clause is the state in which the
contract will be enforced. For example, California is noted as being one
of two states in which the courts do not enforce postemployment
noncompete agreements. 137 Thus, we hypothesize that companies with
contracts that are likely to be contested in the state of California

might be less likely to include CNC clauses. We test this hypothesis
using our data, which are displayed in Table 6 below.
Table 6. CNC Clauses and the California Effect in Explicit
CEO Contracts138

Description
Primary location
in California
Primary location
not in California
Chi-square (p-

Total Number of
Contracts in
Sample

Number in Sample
with CNO Clause
Present (%)

Number in Sample
with No CNC
Clause Present (%)

162

101 (62.4)

61 (37.6)

712
38.6 (<0.0001)

598 (84.0)

114 (16.0)

value)

Table 6 shows that 162 of the sample contracts came from
firms headquartered in California. Of these contracts, only 62.4% (101
contracts) include CNC clauses. By comparison, we analyzed 712
contracts from firms that, according to Compustat, are primarily
located outside California. 139 For these contracts, 84% (598 contracts)
have noncompete agreements. To see if this difference is statistically
significant, we conducted a chi-square test. We found that the test
statistic was 38.60, which is highly statistically significant, and
consistent with our hypothesis that there is a strong California effect
in our data.

136. For example, the American Bar Association sponsors a multi-volume treatise, now in
its ninth edition, surveying aspects of noncompete law across all U.S. jurisdictions. See AM. BAR
Ass'N SECTION OF LABOR & EMP'T LAW, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY

(Brian M. Malsberger et al. eds., 9th ed. 2013).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57 for a discussion of California law related to
the state's ban on postemployment CNCs.
138. To code for enforcement state, we use the variable "Primary Location" as provided in
the Compustat electronic database. Primary location correlates to a firm's headquarters and,
thus, where the CEO is likely to primarily work and where enforcement would logically be
sought in the absence of an explicit choice-of-law provision.
139. We started by using Compustat's primary location variable. If we did not have a value
from that database, we used information from the sample on the state choice of law stated in the
contract.
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Rather than just focusing on one state's lack of enforceability of
CNC clauses, we also used a broader measure, an "enforceability
index," developed by one of the authors. 14 0 The index weights various
factors that impact how strictly an individual state will enforce a CNC
clause in an employment contract. 14 1 In untabulated results, 4 2 we
found that the mean of the enforceability index for the subsamples of
contracts with CNC clauses is 307.6 (median = 350), while the
contracts without CNC clauses have a mean enforceability value of
241.9 (median = 310). The t-statistic for the difference in means is
5.70, which is highly significant (at less than the .0001 level).
However, the test for a difference in the medians is not statistically
significant. In sum, these statistics provide some, but not definitive,
evidence that the level of enforceability is an important factor in the
presence of a CNC clause in a CEO's employment contract.
B. How Long Do These Competitive Restrictions Last and What Do
They Say?
We turn next to the question of how long CNCs and the other
competitive restrictions last and what their provisions say. To better
understand how these clauses are constructed and what they tell us,
we categorized the scope of CNCs and other restrictive covenants,
such as nondisclosure agreements in employment contracts, in two
broad ways. First, we grouped these restrictions by the
postemployment activities they prohibit, such as working for a
competitor or soliciting coworkers to also leave the firm. Second, we
collected information on how the contracts define these prohibitions,
such as the length of the restriction on competition and the geographic
area concerned. In addition, we gathered data on what events or
activities trigger the firm's right to enforce the restriction, and what
enforcement mechanisms and penalties the firms negotiated into the
contract.
Table 7 presents data on the length of the CNC restrictions in
the contracts. The main problem with these data is that, while many
contracts are not triggered by a specified reason for termination, a
significant number of contracts have different provisions for different
types of terminations, such as a termination by the firm for cause or
140. For a detailed description of this state-by-state enforcement index, see Bishara, supra
note 60, at 772-79.
141. We determined the enforcement index for each CEO contract by that contract's state
choice-of-law variable. If the contract was missing such a clause, then we used the contract's
choice-of-forum clause. If that was also missing, then we used the company's primary location.
142. For further information about untabulated results, please contact the authors.
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termination by the employee for good reason. We assigned such
contracts a length based on the maximum specified CNC length for any
termination.1 43
Table 7. Length of Restrictions Contained in CNC Clauses
Number of Contracts

Length

with CNC Clause
with No Specified
Reason for
Termination

Length not

Total Contracts

Maximum
Specified CNC
Length for Any
Termination

with CNC Clause
(Percent of Total
Contracts
Examined)

2

110

112 (16.0)

49

38

87 (12.5)

154

75

229 (32.8)

11

27

38(5.4)

7

4

11(1.6)

315

699 (100.0)

mentioned

Other triggering
event for the limit
of the noncompete
restriction

0 < Length:5 1
year

1 < Lengths52 161
years
2 < Length!5 3

61

222
(31.8)

years

Length > 3 years
Situation best
covered by another
CNCTIME code
Total

315
699

Using this methodology to assign restriction lengths, we found
that the most common lengths are greater than zero, up to one year
(32.8%) and greater than one, up to two years (31.8%). A small
percentage of restrictions last up to three years (5.4%), and an even
smaller group purports to bind a CEO for more than three years (1.6%).
If a CNC is in effect, how does it restrict a CEO's actions? In
untabulated results, we found that there are several types of prohibited
conduct. First, in approximately 80% of the contracts, the CNC
prohibits the CEO from engaging in a number of activities with any
competing company. These include managing, financing, or controlling
a competitor, but exclude holding a nominal equity stake (usually in the
1% to 5% ownership range). At a majority of firms with CNCs, an
additional set of prohibitions bar a CEO from taking a consulting role
with a competing firm (54.8% of contracts).
143. The alternative was to produce a table with far too many rows with a small number of
observations that would be very difficult to read. We do have the data for these different terms
on file though, and a table presenting it can be made available upon request.
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More broadly, CNCs prohibit working for a competitor. In 89% of
the agreements with CNCs, the CNCs forbid the CEO from working for
either broad types of competing firms, specific firms, or just
"competitors." Perhaps because many CEOs are close to the end of their
careers and may want to use their expertise after their roles end, 54%
of contracts specifically prohibit entering a consulting agreement with a
competitor, even though consulting may already be covered by the
general prohibitions on working for a competitor. Typically, when a trial
court is asked to enforce a noncompete clause, a broad prohibition on
"competition" concerning a protectable interest is not unreasonable per
se. 144 Rather, the court determines whether the terms of the restriction
are narrowly tailored to serve the employer's legitimate protectable
business interest and, on balance, whether enforcing the restriction is
impermissibly harmful to the employee or injurious to the public. 4 5
Noncompete clauses have evolved to prohibit specific actions in
addition to the broad, general restrictions against all forms of
competition. Noncompetes are generally assumed to prohibit
4 6 The harm
"poaching" a firm's employees and clients.e
from
47
poaching
arises in several ways. The primary fear is that when the
CEO leaves, he or she will skim the top talent from the firm. In that
case, the former CEO might hire away the most valuable employees
and effectively transfer that human capital and valuable knowledge to
a competitor.1 48 Even where that competitor is a startup, the valuable
employees give the new company an impressive edge in attaining a
competitive advantage.1 49 In the case of a prohibition on the
144. See, e.g., BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that a
restrictive employment covenant is subject to scrutiny, but not unreasonable per se).
145. Id.
146. In addition to the contractually agreed-upon restrictions on otherwise lawful
competition contained in a CNC, it is common for an aggrieved employer to assert tortious
interference with contractual relations against a competitor or former employee involved in the
recruiting of the firm's employees who are under employment contracts, NDAs, or CNCs of their
own. See, e.g., MCS Servs., Inc. v. Jones, No. WMN-10-1042, 2010 WL 3895380, at *5 (D. Md.
Oct. 1, 2010). The Jones court identified the five elements a plaintiff must demonstrate to
support a claim for tortious interference with contract: (1) the existence of a contract between the
first employer and the employee; (2) the new employer's knowledge of that contract; (3) the new
employer's "intentional interference with that contract"; (4) the employee's breach of that
contract; and (5) damages accruing to the former employer. Id. In addition, "the contract
breached must be valid and the interference must have been wrongful and without justification."
Id. (citations omitted). See also Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 764-66
(Iowa 1999) (approving a claim for tortious interference with an employment agreement
containing various restrictive covenants).
147. Soliciting the business and services of former coworkers and clients is disparagingly
known as "poaching." See Kim, supra note 13, at 2.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Bishara & Westermann-Behaylo, supra note 41, at 2, 8
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solicitation of a firm's customers or clients, the protected interest is
even clearer: customers and clients are revenue sources, and those
relationships, often cultivated at great expense over many years, can
serve as a source of competitive advantage. 15 0
Accordingly, to explore the use of these specific CNC terms, we
coded a subset of restrictions related to the solicitation of current
employees to leave the firm and the solicitation of clients and
customers. 15 1 Our results support assumptions about the widespread
use of these two prohibitions on soliciting other employees and
customers. We found, in untabulated results, that 75.6% of CNCs
prohibit soliciting employees. Some clauses specified exceptions, such
as permission for the CEOs to hire away their personal assistants. 152
Even though customer and client solicitation seemingly has a
more direct potential impact on a firm's finances, in untabulated
results, we found that only 50.8% of CNCs prohibit it.153 This
discrepancy seems to indicate that the estimated harm to the business
from a departing CEO subsequently hiring away other valuable
employees is greater than the prospect of a former CEO luring away
customers and clients.
For either type of nonsolicitation clause to be enforceable, the
contract must limit its scope to a reasonable length of time. 154 Some
states' noncompete statutes explicitly provide ranges of reasonable
lengths for specific professions.1 55 Courts reviewing CNCs apply the
traditional reasonableness test on a case-by-case basis, giving a court
the discretion to decide the reasonable scope of each restriction. 156

150. See generally Sharon F. Matusik & Charles W.L. Hill, The Utilization of Contingent
Work, Knowledge Creation, and Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 680, 691-95 (1998)
(concerning human resources management as a source of competitive advantage).
151. For a recent discussion of the boundaries of solicitation of former clients and customers
by a departing employee or the new employer, see Bessemer Trust Co. v. Branin, 949 N.E.2d 462,
469-71 (2011).
152. In the remaining 24.5% of the contracts with a CNC clause, there is no nonsolicitation
clause related to approaching or hiring other employees.
153. In the remaining 49.2% of contracts with CNC clauses, there is no nonsolicitation
clause related to soliciting customers or clients.
154. See Johnson, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
155. For example, the State of Tennessee has a detailed framework of noncompete
legislation that specifically discusses restrictive covenants for physicians and limits the
restriction to a period of two years. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204 (2014); id. §§ 63-1-148, 63-6-603,
68-11-205 (2012).
156. See, for example, EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999),
an oft-cited case representing an early application of the traditional reasonableness test to the
restrictive covenants in the digital world in which the court considered how some high-tech
knowledge will quickly become obsolete, and thus, the reasonableness of any restriction to
protect such information will be judged in that context.
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Generally, a court will deem a CNC length of two years or less an
acceptable time restriction.1 5 7 The data in Table 8 shows that both
types of restrictions are overwhelmingly limited to either a period of
one year or less, or a period between one and two years. Further, when
we combined those two time periods, the data indicated that 73.1% of
employee
nonsolicitation
clauses
and
72.6%
of
customer
nonsolicitation clauses had a restrictive scope of two years or less.
Interestingly, these are very similar to the lengths of the general CNC
restrictions shown in Table 5.
Table 8. Number of Explicit Contracts by Restriction Length of
Time for Nonsolicitation Clauses Prohibiting (1) Approaching
or Hiring Other Employees and (2) Approaching or Otherwise
Interacting with Customers or Clients of the Employer
Clause Length
Time is not specified
0 <Length 5 1 year
1 < Length 5 2 years
2 < Length 5 3 years
Length > 3 years
Length varies
depending on the reason
the CNC restriction is
triggered
Total

1. Number of Employee
Nonsolicitation Clauses

2. Number of Customer or
Client Nonsolicitation

(Percent ofTotal)

Clauses (Percent of Total)

104 (18.3)
221 (38.8)
194 (34.1)
26 (4.6)
7 (1.2)

75 (20.2)
128 (34.4)
135 (36.3)
15 (4.0)
7 (1.9)

17 (3.0)

12 (3.2)

569 (100.0)

372 (100.0)

These results indicate that contract negotiations often yield
what would likely be a reasonable and enforceable time restriction.15 8
In contrast, relatively few contracts (approximately 15) have what
courts would probably consider an unreasonable restriction lasting for
over three years.1 59 In other words, the negotiated terms tend to

157. For example, see statutes in Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2012) (stating that two
years from termination is reasonable, while any additional time exceeding the two years is
voidable and unenforceable), and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-8 to 53-9-12 (2012)
(stating that two years from date of termination is presumptively reasonable).
158. See, e.g., USI Ins. Servs., LLC v. Miner, 801 F. Supp. 2d 175, 190-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(reiterating New York's recognition of nonsolicitation covenants in employment agreements
when needed "to prevent a disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information or where an
employee's services are unique or extraordinary" and finding a two-year restriction not overly
broad in light of previous cases cataloging insurance industry CNC standards).
159. When an agreement is challenged, the courts have discretion to determine the
reasonable duration of a CNC restriction. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d at
313 (holding that, on the facts, even a one-year restriction was "too long given the dynamic
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comply with the underlying noncompete enforcement principles
applied to these contracts.
Table 9 provides data on the geographic scope of CNCs. Over
40% of these clauses are silent about their geographic scope;
presumably, the parties to these contracts rely on preexisting
common-law rules to set geographic limits. Generally speaking, courts
will uphold geographic limitations if they are "reasonable" in scope. 160
Additionally, in some circumstances, courts will uphold CNCs even
when the geographic scope is worldwide. 161
Table 9 shows that if a CNC provides a geographic scope, that
scope most frequently comprises any locations where the employer
operates (38.3% of contracts). Most courts will uphold CNCs that are
limited to areas where the employer operates so long as they are also
reasonable in time. 162 The remaining categories are much broader:
about 10% of covenants cover the entire United States, another 5.3%
purport to bar the employee from working anywhere in the world, and
the remaining 4.3% are limited to an area smaller than the entire
United States, but broader than the employer's places of business.
While courts have previously enforced relatively short global
competition prohibitions, 163 very broad geographic prohibitions that do
not legitimately protect employer interests can be overly burdensome
to employees without protecting legitimate employer interests. 16 4

nature of [the] industry, its lack of geographical borders, and [the departing employee's] former
cutting-edge position").
160. See, e.g., Coady v. Harpo, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (addressing the
reasonableness requirement for restrictive covenant enforcement).
161. See id.
162. See Susanna K. Gibbons, Non-Compete Covenant Held Enforceable Despite Broad
Geographic Scope, NAT'L L. REV. (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/noncompete-covenant-held-enforceable-despite-broad-geographic-scop,
archived at http://perma.cc/
8GX8-D42U (discussing a court decision upholding a covenant not to compete because its sixmonth period was "relatively short").
163. See Court Upholds Covenant Not to Compete, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008),
http://corporate.findlaw.com/business-operations/court-upholds-covenant-not-to-compete.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/577Y-XXNX (discussing court decision upholding noncompete
covenant effective for six months).
164. See, e.g., Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (noting that an employer's "wish[ ] to insulate
himself from competition" should not overcome the "public policy which militate[s] against
sanctioning" job loss); see also Wayne S. Moskowitz, Enforceable Covenants Not to Compete,
FINDLAW
(Mar.
26,
2008),
http://corporate.findlaw.com/business-operations/enforceablecovenants-not-to-compete.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HL8J-TVWA (noting that, in
determining enforceability of noncompete covenants, courts consider "whether the covenant is
too broad and [thus] unduly burdensome" on an employee).
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Table 9. Stated Geographic Scope of CNC Restrictions
Geographic Restriction Scope
No geographic scope stated
Within the U.S. but less than the
entire U.S.
Covers the entire U.S.
Covers the entire world
Covers anywhere the employer
operates
Missing
Total

Number Within each Geographic Category
(Percent of Total)
292 (41.8)
30 (4.3)
71 (10.2)
37 (5.3)
268 (38.3)
1 (0.1)
699

In many of these contracts, we found agreements related to
CEO use of valuable firm information, both during and after
employment. NDAs, or confidentiality agreements, serve to restrict
the use or sharing of information the firm wants to keep proprietary.
These restrictive covenants are not CNCs because they do not prohibit
postemployment competition per se and, as such, are generally
permissible in all jurisdictions. 165 These covenants would be
supplemented by a state's trade secret laws even absent a contract
clause covering the information.166 While, again, the specific
parameters of enforcement vary by state, some courts will treat NDAs
as less onerous and problematic than CNCs and enforce them more
readily than noncompetes,1 67 perhaps because a CNC curtails the
employee's future employment itself and is more clearly
anticompetitive. Also, while an NDA umbrella will cover information
that may qualify as a trade secret, NDAs protect a firm's information
even if the information would otherwise not be a protectable trade
secret. 168
Thus, we predict that the prevalence of NDAs would exceed the
other restrictive covenants we observed. As Table 10 demonstrates,

165. Again, jurisdictions vary in their approaches to enforcing confidentiality agreements,
with some allowing wide enforcement of NDAs, while others will enforce them under the same
reasonableness standard as a CNC, or treat them like CNCs, but with scrutiny on the scope of
the restrictions. See, e.g., Chris Montville, Note, Reforming the Law of ProprietaryInformation,
56 DUKE L.J. 1159, 1180-83 (2007).
166. See, e.g., Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing
the elements of a protectable trade secret).
167. See Courtroom Scis., Inc. v. Andrews, No. 3:09-CV-251-O, 2009 WL 1313274, at *10
(N.D. Tex. May 11, 2009) ("Nondisclosure agreements are not always seen as restraints of trade
in Texas law. However, they are treated like non-compete agreements when the practical effect
of the nondisclosure covenant prohibits the former employee from competing against the former
employer and using the general knowledge acquired in that employment." (citations omitted)).
168. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 43, at 155.
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93.4% of contracts with a CNC also included an NDA, while only
87.1% of all contracts in the full sample contained one. Table 10 also
reveals that nearly 65% of these NDAs are intended to last
indefinitely by their terms. Another 17% of these clauses do not
mention length; thus, the parties presumably intended these
provisions to potentially last indefinitely.
Table 10. Length of Nondisclosure/Confidentiality Agreements
Length of Nondisclosure/Confidentiality
Agreements
Indefinite length
Other triggering event for the termination

Number (Percent
of 699 contracts
with a CNC)
452 (64.7)
23 (3.3)

Number (Percent
of all 874
contracts in
sample)
517 (59.2)
25 (2.9)

4 (0.6)

6 (0.7)

119 (17.0)
5 (0.7)
27 (3.9)
11 (1.6)
12 (1.7)
46 (6.6)
699 (100.0)

147 (16.8)
8 (0.9)
31 (3.5)
12 (1.4)
15(0.6)
113 (12.9)
874 (100.0)

of this restriction

The restriction remains only during
employment and until employee quits or is
terminated
Contract does not mention length
0 < Length 1 year
1 < Length 5 2 years
2 < Length 5 3 years
Length > 3 years
No NDA provision
Total

However, the choice of an indefinite and undefined NDA length
is so pervasive that this trend may indicate that acquiescing to a
strong NDA is a common signal from CEOs that they intend to be
loyal and do not have plans to ever use their employers' information or
even hold other positions. This is likely because a CEO of a public
company is usually nearing the end of his or her career when he or she
joins the firm. In any event, the popularity of the indefinite restriction
indicates that, at a minimum, firms prefer to have the strongest
possible promises from their CEOs to protect confidential information.
These findings are curious in light of U.S. courts' tendency to disfavor
unreasonably long noncompete provisions.1 69

169. See e.g., Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 313:
[C]onsiderations [such as the rapid deterioration of the value of technical knowledge]
predominate here, making a one-year restrictive covenant unreasonably long. While
courts may 'blue pencil' such provisions to make them shorter and hence enforceable,
this Court would decline to exercise its discretion to do so in this case because, as
discussed above, the employment agreement as a whole overreaches.
(citations omitted).
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Next, we looked in greater depth at the specific restrictions in
the NDAs for more evidence of what firms value in terms of the
information they seek to withhold from outsiders. As expected, these
agreements cover a variety of topics, with the choice of what to include
likely related to the type of industry and what information the
employer specifically considers valuable.1 7 0
As with the NDA length variable, we found, in untabulated
results, that the majority of firms will seek the broadest possible
restrictions. This goal is evidenced by the 80% of NDAs that attempt
to expansively cover "all confidential information" available to the
CEO. The NDAs also often cover trade secrets and formulas (54.9% in
this sample), which presumably would already qualify for protection
under most jurisdictions' trade secret laws. The inclusion of this
somewhat redundant protection could be seen as proof that the firm
highly
values
both the
information
and
an
employee's
acknowledgment that such information is protected. Nonetheless, the
term is not so prevalent as to necessarily be a potentially meaningless
boilerplate term.
Additionally, specific categories of prohibited disclosures that
appear regularly in the agreements are customer lists (37.2% of
agreements); proprietary processes, including confidential production
methods and business plans (54.6% of agreements); marketing plans
and strategies (43.5% of agreements); and inventions (17.9% of
agreements).1 7 1 As with the redundant protection for trade secrets,
these terms appear often, but not so often as to indicate that they are
merely pro forma boilerplate that the CEOs blindly accept. Rather, the
inclusion of these terms is likely driven by the nature of the valuable
information that adds to the firm's competitive advantage. Thus, the
terms provide evidence of what the firm values enough to bargain for
in the contract and the postemployment advantage a CEO is willing to
give up in exchange for his or her privilege and lucrative leadership
role.
In Table 11, we present data on the triggers contained in CNC
clauses. We see that, far and away, the most common trigger is any
termination by either party (56.8% of all contracts with CNCs). This is
obviously very broad and will mean that, irrespective of the reason the

170. See, e.g., Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2010)
(discussing two-year, multi-layered, post-employment contractual restrictions related to the
pyrotechnic industry).
171. There were a wide variety of other restrictions of a miscellaneous nature in 63.2% of
the contracts.
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CEO departs the company, the CNC clause will be effective. 7 2
Conversely, a substantial number of the contracts are tailored to the
reasons for the termination: voluntary termination without good reason
by the employee (9.4%); any termination initiated by the employee
(8.6%); any termination by the firm (8.4%); only terminations without
cause by the firm (8.3%), only terminations with cause by the firm
(7.6%); and terminations by the employee with good reason (5.4%).
Table 11. Number and Percent of Contracts Containing
Various Types of Terminations Required to Trigger the
Noncompete Restrictions 7 3
Trigger
Any termination by either party
A change in control voids or modifies the
noncompete
Voluntary termination by employee without

Number (Percent of 699 contracts
with a CNC)
397 (56.8)
73 (10.4)
66 (9.4)

good reason
Any termination by employee
Any termination by firm
Termination by firm without cause
Termination by firm with cause only
Contract doesn't mention a specific trigger
A change in control (such as a sale of a
majority of the firm)
Termination by employee with good reason
During severance period
Other trigger provisions

60
59
58
53
43
41

(8.6)
(8.4)
(8.3)
(7.6)
(6.2)
(5.9)

38 (5.4)
23 (3.3)
4(0.6)

Two interesting subcategories illustrate the effect of a change-ofcontrol transaction: in 73 contracts (10.4% of the sample), a change of
control voids or modifies the CNC, while in an additional 41 contracts
(5.9% of the sample) a change of control acts as a trigger on the CNC so
that the CEO is subject to the CNC's prohibitions. These triggers
illustrate the competing interests of firms in change-of-control
situations: some firms want to free the target company CEO to compete
with the acquiring firm, while others choose to restrict his or her
freedom.

172. Noncompete enforcement subsequent to a not-for-cause termination is controversial
among scholars. See generally Staidl, supra note 110 (discussing the enforceability of noncompete
agreements in the context of at-will employment).
173. There can be multiple triggers coded for the CNCs, so the percentages reported in the
table sum to more than 100%.

2015]

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NONCOMPETES

45

What remedies does the firm have if the CEO breaches a CNC
provision? 74 First, in untabulated data, we found that only 69 of the
contracts with CNCs (9.9%) impose a repayment obligation on the CEO
if he or she breaches the CNC. In other words, over 90% of the time, the
CEO does not have to repay any monies that he or she has already
received from the company. However, as we see in Table 12, this does
not leave the company without remedies.
Table 12. Postemployment Employee Forfeitures and
Company's Ability to Seek Injunctive Relief
Type of Forfeiture Provision
No penalties mentioned in the event of a breach
Employee forfeits stock options
Employee forfeits retirement monetary benefits, such as a
pension or other postemployment payments
Employee forfeits retirement nonmonetary benefits, such as
access to corporate properties, travel allowances, or use of

Number (Percent of
699 contracts with a
CNC)
77 (11.0)
78 (11.2)
51 (7.3)
21 (3.0)

company staff or other resources

Employee pays legal fees and costs if breach is litigated and
employee loses
Employee must repay or reimburse the employer for some
stated expense or benefit
Other penalties to employee for a breach
Company may seek an injunction against employee's breach
of CNC

203 (29.0)
71 (10.2)
405 (57.9)
556 (79.5)

In a significant number of the contracts, the company has the
right to take away a variety of different types of future benefits from
the CEO if he or she breaches his or her CNC. For example, upon
breach, the CEO would forfeit monetary retirement benefits in 51 cases
(7.3% of all contracts), stock options in 78 cases (11.2% of all
companies), and nonmonetary retirement benefits in 21 instances (3.0%
of all contracts).

174. Many employment contracts, including most CEO contracts, also contain arbitration
clauses, which may impact the parties' ability to seek immediate injunctive relief from a court.
See generally Thomas, O'Hara & Martin, supra note 104 (discussing the prevalence of arbitration
provisions in executive contracts). The interplay of state restrictive covenant law and arbitration
clauses was an issue in the only noncompete-related case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court in
many years. See Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503-04 (2012) (reiterating
strong support for the Federal Arbitration Act and arbitration clauses by ruling that, by contract,
the interpretation of a noncompete rested with the arbitrator and not a state court's application
of Oklahoma's CNC statute).
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However, the most important remedy from the company's
perspective is its ability to get an injunction to stop the alleged violation
of the CNC.1 75 Here we found that almost 80% of the sample contracts
expressly provide that the company can seek such an injunction.' 7 6
Including a provision for equitable relief is both logical and potentially
curious. This is because seeking an injunction prohibiting the former
employee's competitive actions, as agreed upon in the contract, is the
normal initial default remedy for a breach and is a means of stopping
any irreparable harm from the departing employee.1 77 In other words,
the employer can always seek an injunction without the prior
contractual consent. Essentially, the plaintiff-employer will argue that
equitable relief is needed to stop the competitive harm because eventual
money damages upon a full adjudication of the case will be
inadequate. 78 Nonetheless, the explicit provisions are likely included as
a means of evidencing the employee's acknowledgment that an
injunction is an appropriate remedy for a breach because of the
difficulty in calculating the damage caused by the competition.17 9
In Table 13, we bring together some of the results of the
previous tables to determine how often companies impose multiple
restrictions on their CEOs. For each CEO, we count whether he or she
has a CNC clause, a nonsolicitation clause relating to customers or
clients, a nonsolicitation clause relating to employees, and an NDA. For
example, a CEO that has all four in his or her contract would be
counted as having four restrictions.

175. For a recent case discussing the movant's burden to support a preliminary injunction in
a noncompete litigation, see Hyde v. KLS Profl Advisors Grp., LLC, 500 Fed. App'x 24, 26 (2d
Cir. 2012) (vacating a district court's entry of a preliminary injunction).
176. Seeking a preliminary injunction remains the preferred method for halting an alleged
irreparable harm in violation of a CNC. See, e.g., Synergy Advanced Pharms., Inc. v. Capebio,
LLC, No. 10 Civ. 1736(SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53252, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2010)
(declining ultimately to issue an injunction after the CNC time period has expired, despite
finding prior violations of the agreement).
177. See, e.g., Quaker Chem. Corp. v. Varga, 509 F. Supp. 2d 469, 478-79 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
The court issued an injunction to enforce a noncompete covenant, noting that it is an
acknowledged "extraordinary remedy." Id. at 478, 484. In doing so, the court restated the four
preliminary factors that must be balanced:
(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits;
(2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief; (3) whether
granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party;
and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.
Id. at 477.
178. See id. at 478-79.
179. See id.
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Table 13. Time Series of the Density of Restrictions in CEO
Contracts - Percent of Contracts in a Year with the Specified
Number of Restrictions 8 0

Number of

Restrictions
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

0

1

2

12%
13%
8%
6%
7%
7%
6%
6%
2%
6%
9%
8%
7%
0%
12%

14%
10%
11%
15%
13%
12%
13%
13%
17%
11%
5%
4%
4%
10%
6%

32%
32%
18%
22%
20%
20%
15%
13%
10%
9%
21%
14%
14%
24%
15%

Total

8%

11%

1996-2000
2001-2005
2006-2010

9%
6%
8%

13%
13%
5%

t

4

5

18%
23%
29%
22%
23%
27%
25%
19%
31%
26%
16%
16%
28%
24%
24%

24%
22%
34%
35%
36%
33%
42%
49%
40%
48%
49%
57%
47%
41%
42%

42%
45%
63%
56%
59%
60%
66%
68%
71%
74%
65%
73%
75%
66%
67%

19%

24%

39%

62%

24%
14%
17%

23%
26%
22%

30%
42%
48%

54%
67%
70%

The data in Table 13 show that on average CEOs have either
three restrictions (24%) or four restrictions (39%) in their employment
contracts. Furthermore, the percentage with three or four restrictions is
increasing over time: in 1996-2000, it was 54%; in 2001-2005, it
increased to 67%; and in 2006-2010, it further increased to 70% of all
employment contracts. In untabulated results, we ran a simple linear
regression of the percent of contracts with three or four restrictive
covenants against the years that they were signed. The results show
that the time trend is statistically significant.18 1 This is consistent with
the claim that CEO contracts have an increasing number of restrictive
covenants in them, a trend evidenced in our data from 1996 to 2010.

180. Restrictions include CNC clause, nonsolicitation of employees, nonsolicitation of
customers or clients, and nondisclosure agreement.
181. The coefficient on the year variable has a t-statistic of 4.45, which is significant at the
.001 level.
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V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

To briefly summarize, our main findings are as follows: In 80%
of CEO employment contracts from 1996-2010, we found CNCs. These
restrictive covenants commonly last one to two years. For CEOs with
CNCs, 89% are forbidden from working for a competitor during the
term of the CNC, while 25% of contracts prohibit CEOs from financing
competitors. These covenants often have a broad geographic scope.
NSAs routinely appear in CEO contracts with 75.6% of these
contracts barring solicitation of the firm's employees and 50.8%
proscribing solicitation of customers or clients, each for a period of one
to two years. We discover that NDAs are quite common as well: 87.1%
of all contracts stop CEOs from disclosing confidential information. It
is also common for NDAs to include a host of other more detailed
prohibitions, often for an indefinite period of time.
Furthermore, more than half of all restrictive covenants are
triggered by any departure of the CEO from the firm, whether
voluntary or involuntary. If triggered, 79.5% of the contracts give
companies the express right to seek injunctions to enforce these
provisions. Finally, we found strong evidence that more and more
restrictive covenants are appearing in these contracts over time, so
that, today, over 70% contain three or four such covenants.
We also empirically examined factors that predict when CEOs
are likely to have CNC provisions or other restrictive covenants, such
as NDAs, in their contracts. Our findings show that CEOs are less
likely to have CNCs in their employment contracts if the contracts are
being enforced in jurisdictions that do not permit strong CNC clauses.
For example, contracts that are likely to be enforced in California,
because a firm is headquartered there, are much less likely to include
noncompete clauses, as California state courts will not enforce the
provisions. 182 While this is consistent with our expectations, it is
comforting to know that companies and their lawyers pay attention to

legal doctrine.
Further, we find a statistically significant trend toward more
noncompete clauses in CEO employment contracts over time. In part,
this may reflect many jurisdictions' increased tendency to enforce

182. Nonetheless, there are a significant number (about 65%) of California firms that still
have CNCs in their CEO contracts when it is highly likely that both parties realize these clauses
are not enforceable. The reasons why unenforceable terms may persist in these contracts are
beyond the scope of this Article. However, possible explanations are that these clauses are
costless to include in this context, and, therefore, the firms' lawyers include CNCs in case
California law changes in the future or perhaps because having a CNC might be seen as a signal
to other stakeholders, such as shareholders.
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these provisions.18 However, it also suggests that employers are more
aware than ever of the importance of using CNC clauses to protect
against the loss of firm-specific investments and knowledge, thus
lending some support to a rationalist, law-and-economics justification
for CNCs-at least in the context of executives with relatively strong
bargaining power.
Our study is also the first to provide reliable evidence to
confirm widely held assumptions in the academic literaturel 84 and
from practitioners' 8 5 that noncompetes are being used more often in
recent years. Unlike previous empirical papers that used the mere
possibility of CNC enforceability regardless of the likelihood of
enforcement, which is an imprecise variable, we demonstrate that this
trend exists with evidence tied to the actual presence of these clauses
in employee contracts.
Next, we demonstrate strong path dependence in the use of
CNC clauses. Our results show that when companies use a
noncompete clause in a CEO employment contract, they are much
more likely to insist on including a noncompete in subsequent CEO
employment contracts. Notably, this effect has not been picked up in
any of the earlier literature on CNC clauses. In addition, this finding
sheds light on the contract negotiation process between firms, who are
the repeat players in these negotiations, and their top employees.
Fourth, our analysis shows that longer-term CEO contracts are
more likely to have CNC clauses than short-term CEO contracts. This
is likely because the companies have more firm-specific investments in
CEOs that stay for longer periods. This finding also fits with some
researchers' predictions when discussing noncompetes in the context
of human capital investments.1 86
There are some potential policy implications to be drawn from
what we have learned. First, this information may be useful to
informing the debate over CEO dominance and executive
compensation because it provides additional evidence that CEOs are
183. See generally Bishara, supra note 60, at 780.
184. See Lester, supra note 5, at 49; Moffat, supra note 5, at 876; Stone, supra note 5, at
577; Whitmore, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2014, at B1 (citing one practitioner who sees an increase in
noncompete litigation and noted that "[clompanies are spending money, hiring lawyers, to go
after people-just to put the fear of death in them"); see also Lublin, supra note 18 (discussing a
Beck Reed Riden LLP study, which found that the "number of published U.S. court decisions
involving non-compete agreements has risen 61% since 2002 to 760 last year . . . [and the]
increase largely reflects the increased usage of non-compete arrangements among lower-level
staffers-along with employees' greater mobility and access to sensitive information").
186. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 25, at 99.
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willing to give up a future right of free mobility and because it goes
against claims that CEOs ride roughshod over board decisionmaking
related to CEO contract terms. Second, because our study is focused
on CEOs and not average employees, who may be subject to employer
overreaching and abuse, our findings provide future researchers with
a glimpse into what competitive restrictions firms value enough to pay
for at a premium. Third, our findings on the prevalence of CEO
noncompetes and the connection to profitability may provide certain
stakeholders, such as investors and analysts, with another piece of
information about how firms interact with their single most
influential employees and where the bargaining balance lies between
CEO dominance and board-of-directors influence. Also, future
researchers could use our findings about CEOs as a starting point to
investigate to what extent executive employment terms match or
influence the restrictions on other employees throughout the firm.
Finally, of particular note is our finding that long-term
contracts are more likely to have noncompete clauses than short-term
contracts. This is probably because firms are likely to invest more in
CEOs who they believe will stay for relatively longer periods. This
suggests that a firm that negotiates and enters into a longer-term
employment relationship with a CEO will invest in this individual in
part due to the added protection that a CNC provides for those
investments. Thus, this situation is consistent with a law-andeconomics justification for CNCs to facilitate investment in human
capital that can perhaps lead to more stable executive leadership,
which can also have an influence on firm profitability.
Overall, this evidence, in addition to our findings that CNC
enforceability in a jurisdiction is correlated with the presence of a
CNC, provides more information to state policymakers who are in the
process of reviewing their noncompete enforcement policies. This is
because our research demonstrates that there is value to allowing
CNCs between executives and firms, despite the remaining fairness
concerns with enforcing noncompetes for average employees with less
bargaining power. Specifically, this research tends to support the
recent state laws that treat employees with high-level supervisory or
other management roles as a unique category of employees under
CNC policy.1 87 Our findings also support the intuition of the
legislators who are currently proposing statutes that render CNCs

187. This is consistent with, for instance, the Colorado restrictive covenant statute, which
allows noncompete enforcement for executive-level employees, but not other workers. See COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2012).
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enforceable against executive-level or high-earning employees only, 8 8
instead of simply imposing a California-like ban on all employee
noncompetes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The heated debate among scholars, legal practitioners, and
policymakers over the impact and proper role, if any, of employee
restrictive covenants is likely to persist for some time. Addressing
these concerns systematically is important because human capital
management is increasingly crucial to securing and maintaining a
competitive advantage in a globalized knowledge economy. Thus,
developing empirical research in the area of restrictive covenants is
key to informing this debate.
Our study is an important step toward understanding the
prevalence and deployment of CNCs, NDAs, and NSAs by employers
over a significant length of time. By closely examining a large set of
highly negotiated employment contracts, we have provided previously
unavailable evidence of how employers are using restrictive covenants
to impede the postemployment mobility of key employees. This
evidence shows that there is an increase in the use and methodical
layering of restrictive covenants for these employees over time and
that the underlying legal rules have an impact on the use of these
agreements. Our findings also illuminate the complex give-and-take
bargaining environment for firms and their most powerful employees,
where curtailing postemployment competition is a high priority for the
employers. The growing prevalence of a portfolio of restrictions for
executives also provides support for arguments that CEOs do not
simply dominate their boards in the realm of employment contracting.
Further, this detailed picture of restrictive covenants in CEO
contracts is a useful contribution to the discussion about how to enable
or curtail employers' use of restrictive covenants generally. Our study
is a starting point for further research and can serve as a model for
the scope and depth of inquiry required to develop a full
understanding of how these controversial agreements impact other
types of workers throughout individual firms and across the entire
economy.

188. See, e.g., H. 2293, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2011), available at http://
www.massachusettsnoncompetelaw.comuploads/file/Noncompete%20Bill%20-%202011%2OAs%2
OFiled%201-20-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C8TN-3XMC.

